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Judicial Review of Disproportionate 
(or Retaliatory) Deportation 
Jason A. Cade* 
Abstract 
This Article focuses attention on two recent and notable federal 
court opinions considering challenges to Trump Administration 
deportation decisions. While finding no statutory bar to the 
noncitizens’ detention and deportation in these cases, the court in 
each instance paused to highlight the injustice of the removal 
decisions. This Article places the opinions in the context of emerging 
immigration enforcement trends, which reflect a growing 
indifference to disproportionate treatment as well as enforcement 
actions founded on retaliation for the exercise of constitutional 
rights. Judicial decisions like the ones considered here serve vital 
functions in the cause of immigration law reform even as they 
uphold government enforcement decisions. They help motivate 
advocates, promote inter-branch dialogue, and provide progress 
toward judicial innovation. This Article focuses particular 
attention on this steps-on-the-way function, suggesting how the 
concerns these courts have expressed may one day soon produce a 
greater measure of judicial scrutiny of removal decisions on 
proportionality grounds.  
                                                                                                     
 * Associate Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law. My 
gratitude to David Baluarte and the Washington and Lee Law Review for 
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I. Introduction 
On May 30, 2017, Judge Stephen Reinhardt authored an 
opinion denying Andres Magaña Ortiz’s emergency request that 
the Ninth Circuit temporarily block the government from 
deporting him to Mexico.1 Even while finding that the court lacked 
authority to grant a stay of removal in the case, Judge Reinhardt 
penned a scathing five-page opinion explaining why the 
government’s decision to deport Mr. Ortiz was “inhumane” and 
“contrary to the values of this nation and its legal system.”2 
                                                                                                     
 1. See Ortiz v. Sessions (Ortiz II), 857 F.3d 966, 966–67 (9th Cir. 2017) 
(denying Mr. Ortiz’s request for stay of removal). 
 2. Id. at 968.  
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In a decision issued on January 29, 2018, Judge Katherine 
Forrest of the Southern District of New York likewise found no 
statutory irregularities in the Department of Homeland Security’s 
decision to detain and enforce a removal order against Ravideth 
Ragbir.3 Nevertheless, Judge Forrest granted Mr. Ragbir’s habeas 
petition, holding that the Due Process Clause required 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to release him so 
that he could get his affairs in order and say goodbye to his family 
prior to deportation. This result was required, she explained, 
because “this country allowed petitioner to become a part of our 
community fabric, allowed him to build a life with and among 
us . . . .”4 Additionally, Judge Forrest noted with “grave concern” 
allegations that the government was targeting Ragbir for removal 
on the basis of his political advocacy.5 Those concerns are now front 
and center in related litigation.6 
In this Article, I briefly discuss each of these notable decisions 
and then place them in a larger context, explaining their 
significance within the Trump Administration’s deportation 
regime. Present-day interior immigration enforcement is marked 
by two major trends. First, the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) has abandoned the prior Administration’s priority-driven 
enforcement policies and adopted a mass and indiscriminate 
approach to enforcement. The result is that the DHS now 
endeavors to deport virtually anyone who is deportable, whether 
or not the individual can demonstrate the sort of significant 
positive equities, or lack of negative ones, that previously helped 
                                                                                                     
 3. See Ragbir v. Sessions, 18-cv-236, 2018 WL 623557, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 
29, 2018) (“The Court agrees that the statutory scheme governing petitioner’s 
status is properly read to allow for his removal without further right of contest.”).  
 4. See id. at *2 (granting Mr. Ragbir’s habeas petition).  
 5. See id. at *1 n.1 (“The Court also notes with grave concern the argument 
that petitioner has been targeted as a result of his speech and political advocacy 
on behalf of immigrants’ rights and social justice.”). 
 6. See Ragbir v. Homan, No. 1:18-cv-01159, 2018 WL 3038494 (S.D.N.Y. 
June 19, 2018); Immigrant Rights Leader Ravi Ragbir and Community 
Organizations File First Amendment Lawsuit Challenging the Targeting of 
Immigrant Rights Activists, NAT’L IMMIGR. PROJECT (Feb. 9, 2018), 
https://www.nationalimmigrationproject.rg/pr/2018_9Feb_ragbir-v-homan.html 
(last visited Sept. 21, 2018) (“The lawsuit seeks . . . a preliminary and permanent 
injunction restraining the government from selectively enforcing immigration 
laws against individuals based on protected political speech.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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stave off removal. Second, though to a less prevalent extent, 
current DHS practice suggests a growing pattern of what appears 
to be targeted retaliatory action against immigrant activists who 
openly express criticism of the Administration’s policies through 
protected speech activities.7  
Especially against this backdrop, judicial decisions such as 
those considered in this Article serve important functions. They 
attract media attention and galvanize the efforts of advocates to 
fight and seek reform of the Administration’s policies, both on 
behalf of particular individuals and more broadly. They also 
function as signals to the political branches that policy or rule 
changes are needed. Finally, the decisions represent an accretion 
of authority toward more substantive proportionality review. As 
the judicial pronouncements (and related litigation) considered in 
this Article illustrate, the harsh results caused by the 
Administration’s policies may well lead judges to engage in a more 
searching review of enforcement actions. Courts increasingly will 
be confronted with difficult questions about proportionality, due 
process, equal protection, and protected speech. This Article 
outlines doctrinal developments that may eventually cause courts 
to stay excessively harsh but otherwise valid removal orders on 
substantive constitutional grounds. A close look at the Court’s 
recent jurisprudence in the deportation context reveals increasing 
sensitivity to proportionality concerns, lending additional weight 
to new challenges based on due process, the First Amendment, or 
arbitrary and capricious review. Of particular importance are 
hybrid claims, in which the joint force of multiple constitutional 
violations may combine to justify judicial intervention in egregious 
situations. 
                                                                                                     
 7. See, e.g., John Burnett, Immigration Advocates Warn ICE Is Retaliating 
for Activism, NPR (March 16, 2018, 10:29 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/03/16/ 
593884181/immigration-advocates-warn-ice-is-retaliating-for-activism (last 
visited Sept. 9, 2018) (noting that at least “two dozen cases of immigrant activists 
and volunteers who say they have been arrested or face fines for their work”) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Undocumented Activist Targeted 
by ICE Asks Immigration Judge to Throw Out Case Based on First Amendment, 
MIJENTE (Mar. 13, 2018), https://mijente.net/2018/03/13/undocumented-activist-
targeted-by-ice/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2018) (documenting an immigrant activist’s 
argument that she is being singled out for deportation by ICE precisely because 
of her years of political activity against the agency) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review); see also infra Part II.B (acknowledging Ragvi Ragbir’s 
activism as a particularly concerning factor in his proceedings). 
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The Article proceeds as follows. Part II discusses the judicial 
opinions reviewing challenges to DHS’s decisions to remove Andres 
Magaña Ortiz and Ravi Ragbir, as well as related litigation that 
grapples with claims of retaliatory enforcement. This examination 
places each decision in the larger context of enforcement trends in 
the first year of the Trump Administration. Part III explains the 
significance of each decision today, including by showing how they 
further dialogue with the political branches and galvanize 
awareness and advocacy regarding the issues. Finally, Part IV 
considers key legal principles that might enable courts to engage 
in more substantive proportionality review of removal orders in 
future litigation. 
II. Two Notable Lower Court Decisions 
A. Ortiz v. Sessions: “Even the ‘Good Hombres’ Are Not Safe”8 
As Judge Reinhardt recounted, Mr. Ortiz entered the United 
States without authorization in 1989 at age fifteen.9 Over three 
decades, Mr. Ortiz built a life and deep ties in the United States.10 
He worked his way up from fruit-picker to owner of a twenty-acre 
coffee farm, while also managing operations on 150 additional 
acres that support entrepreneurial efforts by others.11 Ortiz 
married a U.S. citizen, built a house, and supported three U.S. 
citizen children, currently of high school and college age.12 The 
eldest daughter attended University of Hawaii, an education 
                                                                                                     
 8. Ortiz II, 857 F.3d at 968.  
 9. See id. at 967 (“Magana Ortiz . . . first entered the United States at 
15 . . . . [h]is immigration case concluded with a decision to remove Magana Ortiz 
because of his 1989 illegal entry into the United States.”). 
 10. See id. (detailing Mr. Ortiz’s life in the United States). 
 11. See Derek Hawkins, Facing Deportation, Hawaii Coffee Farmer, Father 
of Three Returns to Mexico After 28 Years, WASH. POST (July 10, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2017/07/10/facing-
deportation-hawaii-coffee-farmer-father-of-three-returns-to-mexico-after-28-
years/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.d95e48c91d5f (last visited Sept. 9, 2018) 
(documenting Mr. Ortiz’s success as a coffee farmer) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 12. See Ortiz II, 857 F.3d 966, 967 (9th Cir. 2017) (“All of his children, ages 
12, 14, and 20, were born in this country and are American citizens . . . .”). 
1432 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1427 (2018) 
which Mr. Ortiz financed.13 He paid taxes and contributed to 
society in other ways, as well.14 For example, as Judge Reinhardt 
explained, Ortiz “has worked with the United States Department 
of Agriculture in researching the pests afflicting Hawaii’s coffee 
crop, and agreed to let the government use his farm, without 
charge, to conduct a five-year study.”15 
DHS initiated removal proceedings against Ortiz in 2011, 
apparently on the basis of unauthorized entry and presence in the 
United States.16 The immigration judge denied Ortiz’s request for 
cancellation of removal or voluntary departure and ordered him 
removed on December 22, 2011.17 Nevertheless, and 
unsurprisingly in light of his circumstances, Ortiz received 
successive stays of removal from DHS, which, Judge Reinhardt 
noted, were granted to “allow[] him to remain with his family and 
pursue available routes to legal status.”18 Notably, Mr. Ortiz’s wife 
had filed a family-based petition that would allow him to adjust his 
status inside the United States to lawful permanent residence as 
the immediate family member of a U.S. citizen.19  
In March 2017, however, DHS—in keeping with new policies 
implemented following President Trump’s inauguration—denied 
any further stays of removal.20 Mr. Ortiz filed a habeas petition in 
the district court of Hawaii for an emergency nine month stay, but 
it was denied.21  
                                                                                                     
 13. See id. (“[Ortiz’s] eldest daughter currently attends the University of 
Hawaii, and he is paying for her education.”). 
 14. See id. (“In his time in this country Magana Ortiz has built a house, 
started his own company, and paid his taxes.”). 
 15. Id. 
 16. See Ortiz v. Sessions (Ortiz I), CIVIL 17-00210 LEK-KJM, 2017 WL 
2234176, at *1 (D. Haw. May 22, 2017) (“DHS initiated removal proceedings 
against Magana Ortiz by filing a Notice to Appear (“NTA”) on March 22, 2011 
with the Immigration Court in Honolulu.”). 
 17. See id. (“The Immigration Judge held a merits hearing and, on December 
22, 2011, denied Magana Ortiz’s applications for relief . . . .”). 
 18. Ortiz II, 857 F.3d at 967. 
 19. See id. (“Magana Ortiz is currently attempting to obtain legal status on 
the basis of his wife’s and children’s citizenship, a process that is well underway. 
It has been over a year since his wife, Brenda, submitted her application to have 
Magana Ortiz deemed her immediate relative.”). 
 20. See id. (“[T]he government on March 21, 2017 reversed its position, and 
ordered [Ortiz] to report for removal the next month.”). 
 21. See Ortiz I, 2017 WL 2234176, at *7 (denying Mr. Ortiz’s habeas 
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On appeal, the Ninth Circuit agreed that the district court 
lacked authority to stay the order.22 Nevertheless, it issued a 
searing decision condemning DHS’s failure to grant Ortiz a stay 
while his wife’s family-based petition was adjudicated. Judge 
Reinhardt described the agency’s removal decision as “contrary to 
the values of this nation and its legal system.”23 This approach to 
immigration enforcement, he noted, “diminishes not only our 
country but our courts.”24 He added that “Ortiz and his family are 
in truth not the only victims . . . . Among the others are judges 
who, forced to participate in such inhumane acts, suffer a loss of 
dignity and humanity as well.”25 As I discuss in Part IV, courts 
might yet intervene in “inhumane” deportation decisions on a more 
robust basis than Judge Reinhardt acknowledged. For present 
purposes, however, Judge Reinhardt’s takeaway was aptly put: 
under the Trump Administration “even the ‘good hombres’ are not 
safe.”26 
One telling feature of the opinion is that Judge Reinhardt 
explicitly characterized the substantive interests at stake for Ortiz 
and his family as “rights.”27 In addition to the hardship facing 
Ortiz, the court emphasized concerns related to family integrity, 
including the children’s “right to be with their father” and Mrs. 
Ortiz’s “right to be with her husband.”28 As the court noted, none 
of them speak Spanish or has ever lived in Mexico.29 Judge 
Reinhardt also catalogued significant property interests 
implicated by Ortiz’s deportation, including removal from his land, 
forfeiture of a substantial business, and disruption of his 
                                                                                                     
petition). 
 22. See Ortiz II, 857 F.3d at 966–67 (noting that the court did not have 
authority to grant Mr. Ortiz’s request for a stay of removal). 
 23. Id. at 968. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. See, e.g., id. at 967 (“The government’s insistence on expelling a good 
man from the country in which he has lived for the past 28 years deprives his 
children of their right to be with their father, his wife of her right to be with her 
husband . . . .”). 
 28. Id. 
 29. See id. at 968 (“All three children were born in the United States; none 
has ever lived in Mexico or learned Spanish.”). 
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investment in his eldest daughter’s education.30 According to the 
court, the family will no longer be able to occupy their home after 
Ortiz is deported.31  
On the government’s side of the ledger, Judge Reinhardt 
observed that the underlying immigration offenses in Mr. Ortiz’s 
case were not grave or recent. His primary immigration offense 
was entering the U.S. without inspection nearly twenty years ago, 
before a change in law that made unlawful entry a bar to 
adjustment of status to lawful permanent residence.32 The court 
noted that Ortiz did have at least one, and possibly two, convictions 
for driving under the influence.33 But the most recent of these—if 
it was in fact a conviction—occurred fourteen years ago.34 In any 
event, the court noted, both offenses involved “at most” a fine with 
probation.35 Indeed, the government itself had conceded during the 
underlying proceedings that there was no question as to Ortiz’s 
good moral character.36  
One reasonable way of summing up the court’s opinion would 
be to say that Ortiz’s removal raised significant proportionality 
concerns. There were substantial rights at stake, and the balance 
of interests as articulated by the Ninth Circuit tipped heavily in 
favor of Ortiz. His positive, mitigating equities were unusually 
                                                                                                     
 30. See id. at 967 (explaining the property Mr. Ortiz risks losing as a result 
of deportation). 
 31. See id. at 968 n. 2 (“The family’s right to occupy their home will terminate 
upon Magana Ortiz’s removal.”). 
 32. See 8 U.S.C. §1182(a)(6)(A)(i) (2012) (noncitizens who enter the United 
States without inspection are inadmissible); 8 U.S.C. §1255(a) (2012) (noncitizens 
who enter without inspection are ineligible for adjustment of status). The general 
bar to adjustment of status for persons who entered without inspection is not 
applicable for persons who entered before April 1, 1997. See IRA J. KURZBAN, 
IMMIGRATION LAW SOURCEBOOK 129 (14th ed.) (collecting authorities); PAUL 
VIRTUE, ACTING EXEC. ASSOC. COMM., INS, Additional Guidance for Implementing 
Sections 212(a)(6) and 212(a)(9) of the INA, 5-6 HQ IRT 50/51.2, 96 Act 043 (June 
17, 1997). 
 33. See Ortiz II, 857 F.3d 966, 967 (9th Cir. 2017) (“Although he apparently 
has two convictions for driving under the influence, the latest of them occurred 
fourteen years ago, and he has no history of any other crimes.”). 
 34. See id. at n. 1 (noting some confusion as to whether Mr. Ortiz’s second 
DUI resulted in a conviction). 
 35. Id. 
 36. See id. (“Indeed, even the government conceded during the immigration 
proceedings that there was no question as to Magana Ortiz’s good moral 
character.”). 
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high in the face of relatively minor and distant negative factors. 
His removal would result in clear and substantial hardship. 
Indeed, the penalty imposed by removal was even 
greater— perhaps far greater—than the court perceived. Recall 
that Ortiz’s wife had filed a pending family petition as immediate 
relative.37 Because Ortiz entered the United States prior to April 
1, 1997, he was eligible to adjust status to lawful permanent 
residence on the basis of this petition without having to leave the 
country.38 Once deported, however, Ortiz became subject to two 
separate penalties that barred him from lawful reentry for ten 
years.39 Thus, this was just the sort of case that, common sense 
suggests, warranted the agency’s exercise of discretion to stay 
removal. 
B. Ragbir v. Sessions: “There Are Times When Statutory Schemes 
May Tread on Rights that Are Larger, More Fundamental” 40 
Ravidath Ragbir, a well-known and highly respected 
community leader in New York City, has resided in the United 
States for twenty-five years.41 He became a legal permanent 
                                                                                                     
 37. See id. (“Magana Ortiz is currently attempting to obtain legal status on 
the basis of his wife’s and children’s citizenship, a process that is well 
underway. It has been over a year since his wife, Brenda, submitted her 
application to have Magana Ortiz deemed her immediate relative.”). Additionally, 
Ortiz would shortly become eligible to immediately benefit from a separate 
petition that could be filed by his soon to be twenty-one-year-old U.S. citizen child. 
See id. (“This August, his eldest daughter, Victoria, will turn 21, and will also be 
able to file an application for her father.”). 
 38. See supra note 32 and accompanying text (explaining why Mr. Ortiz’s 
pre-1997 entry date makes him eligible to adjust his residency status despite 
unlawful entry and unauthorized presence). Ortiz would still have to reopen the 
prior removal order. But with an approved I-130 and good moral character not in 
doubt, this typically would be matter of course. 
 39. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii)(I) (2012) (placing a ten-year bar on 
readmission for any noncitizen ordered removed); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B) (2012) 
(establishing a ten-year bar on readmission for anyone who accrued at least one 
year of unlawful presence before leaving the United States). Cf. State Farm v. 
Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2008) (holding unconstitutional on due process 
grounds civil penalties “exceeding a single-digit ratio” to the consequences that 
are otherwise applicable). 
 40. Ragbir v. Sessions, 18-cv-236, 2018 WL 623557, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 
2018).  
 41. See id. at *1 n.3 (noting that Mr. Ragbir came to the United States in 
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resident in 1994, but lost that status when he was ordered removed 
in 2007 following a conviction for wire fraud activities as a 
mortgage loan processor.42 Nevertheless, in light of his long 
residence and other mitigating factors, Ragbir was granted 
successive stays of removal that authorized him to work and 
remain in the United States.43 He is married to a U.S. citizen, has 
a child who is a U.S. citizen, and has devoted his life to social 
justice advocacy.44  
With his last administrative stay of removal scheduled to 
expire on January 19, 2018, Mr. Ragbir submitted a renewal 
request in November 2017, based in part on a pending motion to 
reopen his removal proceedings.45 During a check-in with ICE on 
January 11, 2018, however, Ragbir was abruptly detained.46 The 
ICE Field Office Director indicated that the stay application had 
been denied and that Mr. Ragbir would be promptly deported to 
Trinidad and Tobago.47 ICE officers then transported a handcuffed 
Ragbir to Newark Airport (interrupted only by a short visit to a 
local hospital, after he lost consciousness). He was then flown to 
Miami, Florida.48  
On January 29, 2018, Judge Katherine Forrest of the 
Southern District of New York granted Ragbir’s habeas petition 
just as DHS was preparing to deport him.49 As in the case of Ortiz 
                                                                                                     
1994).  
 42. See id. at *3 n.11 (noting the reason for the deportation order). 
 43. See id. at *2 n.6 (detailing Mr. Ragbir’s numerous stays of removal from 
2011 through 2016). 
 44. See id. at *1 n.2, n.3 (detailing Mr. Ragbir’s personal life). 
 45. See id at *2 n.6 (“[Ragbir’s] most recent stay renewal request was filed 
on November 16, 2017.”). 
 46. See id. at *1 (“[O]n January 11, 2018, Ravidath Ragbir was suddenly 
taken into custody. He was informed that his time in this country was at an 
end . . . .”). 
 47. See Amended Declaration of Field Office Dir. Thomas R. Decker at 
10–11, ¶ 36 Ragbir v. Homan, 1:18-cv-01159 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2018) ECF No. 
56-1 [hereinafter Decker Amended Declaration] (explaining that “the plan was to 
take [Ragbir] into custody and transport him to . . . Trinidad and Tobago . . .”). In 
apparent departure from normal procedure, Scott Mechkowski, ICE Field Office 
Director, handled the check-in personally, revealing the intense scrutiny on 
Ragbir’s case. See id. at 11, ¶ 38 (explaining that Thomas Decker did not meet 
with Ragbir on January 11, 2018). 
 48. See id. at 11, ¶¶ 37–41. 
 49. See Ragbir v. Sessions, 2018 WL 623557, at *3 (granting Ragbir’s habeas 
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in the Ninth Circuit,50 Judge Forrest found the government’s 
actions in Ragbir’s case to be statutorily authorized.51 
Nevertheless, she held, the agency’s implementation of the 
statutory scheme “tread on rights that are larger, more 
fundamental”—indeed, “rights that define who we are as a 
country.”52 Accordingly, she ordered his release so that he could get 
his affairs in order and have an opportunity to say goodbye to his 
family.53 
Although Judge Forrest did not engage in an explicit 
balancing of interests, she made clear that she was invoking the 
liberty and due process norms of the Fifth Amendment, which she 
described as constitutional “North Stars.”54 Citing Mathews v. 
Eldridge,55 in which the Supreme Court set forth controlling, 
balancing-based procedural due process principles, the judge 
observed that “if due process means anything at all, it means that 
we must look at the totality of circumstances and determine 
whether we have dealt fairly when we are depriving a person of 
the most essential aspects of life, liberty, and family.”56  
In this case, the government had long allowed Ragbir to 
become “part of the community fabric” and to “build a life with and 
among us.”57 For years, he had been employed with express 
authority, helped support and raise his citizen child with his 
citizen spouse, and worked actively to better the local and national 
community.58 This, the judge wrote, required the government at 
                                                                                                     
petition).  
 50. See supra Part II.A (explaining that the court in Ortiz found no statutory 
deficiencies in the government’s actions). 
 51. See Ragbir v. Sessions, 18-cv-236, 2018 WL 623557, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 
29, 2018) (“The Court agrees that the statutory scheme governing petitioner’s 
status is properly read to allow for his removal without further right of contest.”). 
 52. Id. at *2. 
 53. See id. at *3 (“[T]he Court is convinced that it must grant the petition for 
habeas corpus. Constitutional principles of due process and the avoidance of 
unnecessary cruelty here allow and provide for an orderly departure. Petitioner 
is entitled to the freedom to say goodbye.”). 
 54. Id. at *2. 
 55. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).  
 56. See Ragbir, 2018 WL 623557, at *2 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 
319, 334 (1976), for the proposition that “due process, unlike some legal rules, is 
not a technical conception with fixed content . . .; due process is flexible . . . .”). 
 57. Id. 
 58. See id. at *1 n.3 (explaining Ragbir’s work as an immigrant rights 
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least to allow him “orderly departure when the time came,” marked 
by the “avoidance of unnecessary cruelty.”59 Judge Forrest also 
invoked the Eight Amendment’s guarantee that individuals “not [] 
be subjected to excessive sanctions.”60 She explained that despite 
being nominally non-punitive, the processes and penalties 
employed in Ragbir’s case were “shock[ing]” and “unusual.”61 
Throughout her opinion, Judge Forrest pointed to the gratuitously 
cruel nature of the government’s approach to Ragbir’s case.62 In 
substance, like Judge Reinhardt, Judge Forrest invoked norms of 
proportionality in reviewing the government’s actions. In addition, 
by recognizing a constitutionally protected “right to say goodbye,” 
Judge Forrest’s proportionality review went further than the 
Ninth Circuit, though she stopped well short of identifying a right 
to remain in the face of an otherwise valid removal order. 
Finally, although she touched on the point only briefly in a 
footnote, Judge Forrest observed “with grave concern” the 
possibility that Ragbir was being “targeted as a result of his speech 
and political advocacy on behalf of immigrants’ rights and social 
justice.”63 Ragbir has a national reputation for his activism as an 
immigrant rights leader.64 Much of this work is service-oriented, 
focusing on advocacy and informational programs for immigrants. 
                                                                                                     
advocate). 
 59. Id at *2. 
 60. Id. at *3 n.10 (quoting Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 469 (2012) and 
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005)). 
 61. Id.  
 62. See id. at *1 (“The wisdom of our Founders is evident in the document 
that demands and requires . . . an aversion to acts that are unnecessarily cruel.”); 
id. at *2 (“In sum, the Court finds that when this country allowed petitioner to 
become a part of our community fabric, . . . it committed itself to avoidance of 
unnecessary cruelty . . . .”); id. at *3 (“Here, instead, the process we have 
employed has also been unnecessarily cruel.”). 
 63. Id. at *1, n.1 (citing United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 716 (2012) 
for the principle that “as a general matter, the First Amendment means that 
government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, 
its subject matter, or its content”). 
 64. See, e.g., Memorandum of Law of Amici Curiae Scholars and Public 
Interest Advocates and Organizations in Support of Ravidath Lawrence Ragbir’s 
Motion for Declaratory, Injunctive, and Habeas Corpus Relief at 2–4, Ragbir v. 
Homan, No. 18-Civ.-1159, 2018 WL 2338792 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2018); 
Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction 
at 2–3, Ragbir v. Homan, No. 18-Civ.-1159, 2018 WL 2338792 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 
2018). 
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Notably, as Executive Director of the New Sanctuary Coalition of 
New York City, he has frequently and publicly challenged aspects 
of both the current and the previous Administrations’ immigration 
policies.65 He has testified before the New York City Council 
regarding immigration matters and local leaders have sought his 
counsel. In 2017, the New York State Association of Black and 
Puerto Rican Legislators awarded Ragbir the Immigrant 
Excellence Award, and a South Asian American advocacy group 
presented him with the ChangeMaker Award.66 In sum, he is a 
highly visible political activist. 
This retaliatory-enforcement concern is now front and center 
in related litigation before Judge Kevin Castel of the Southern 
District of New York, from whom Ragbir and others have sought a 
preliminary injunction, primarily on the basis of a First 
Amendment claim.67 
C. The Larger Context of Immigration Enforcement Under the 
Trump Administration 
DHS’s decisions to remove Ortiz and Ragbir are illustrative of 
the larger picture of immigration enforcement in the first eighteen 
months of the Trump presidency. Two trends in particular mark 
the approach of DHS thus far to interior immigration enforcement. 
The first, and most predominant trend, is characterized by mass, 
indiscriminate deportation.68 This new policy direction was 
                                                                                                     
 65. See Ragbir v. Sessions, 18-cv-236, 2018 WL 623557, at *1 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 
Jan. 29, 2018) (“[Ragbir] is the Executive Director of the New Sanctuary Coalition 
of New York City, sits on the Steering Committee of the New York State Interfaith 
Network for Immigration Reform, and has served as the Chair of the Board of 
Families for Freedom.”). 
 66. See supra notes 64–65 and accompanying text (listing Ragbir’s 
accolades). 
 67. See Ragbir v. Homan, 1:18-cv-01159, 2018 WL 2338792, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 
May 23, 2018); see also Immigrant Rights Leader Ravi Ragbir and Community 
Organizations File First Amendment Lawsuit Challenging the Targeting of 
Immigrant Rights Activists, NAT’L IMMIGR. PROJECT (Feb. 9, 2018), 
https://www.nationalimmigrationproject.org/pr/2018_9Feb_ragbir-v-homan.html 
(last visited Sept. 9, 2018) (documenting statement from plaintiff’s counsel 
regarding the claim’s First Amendment basis) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 68. See Jason A. Cade, Sanctuaries as Equitable Delegation in an Era of 
Mass Immigration Enforcement, 113 NW. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018), 
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initiated within a week of President Trump’s inauguration in a 
series of executive orders on immigration enforcement.69 One of 
these, entitled Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the 
United States, explained the Administration’s new enforcement 
priorities.70 It directed DHS to prioritize the removal of noncitizens 
charged or suspected of any criminal offense, as well as those 
subject to final removal orders.71 Another order, entitled Border 
Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements, directed 
immigration authorities to detain and remove all “individuals 
apprehended on suspicion of violating Federal or State law, 
including Federal immigration law.”72  
Shortly thereafter, then-Secretary of Homeland Security John 
Kelly issued new agency memoranda that discarded the Obama 
Administration’s prosecutorial discretion guidelines.73 Likewise, 
ICE Associate Director Matthew Albence directed agency officers 
to “take enforcement action against all removable aliens 
encountered in the course of their duties.”74 The executive orders, 
together with the implementing agency memoranda, classify 
                                                                                                     
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3053609 [hereinafter Cade, 
Sanctuaries]. 
 69. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 30, 2017) 
(explaining the Trump Administration’s immigration enforcement policy); see also 
Meridith McGraw, A Timeline of Trump’s Immigration Executive Order and Legal 
Challenges, ABC NEWS (Jun. 29, 2017, 12:22 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/ 
Politics/timeline-president-trumps-immigration-executive-order-legal-challen 
ges/story? id=45332741 (last visited Sept. 9, 2018) (detailing the series of events 
surrounding Trump’s 2017 executive orders on immigration). 
 70. See Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 30, 2017) (explaining 
the Trump Administration’s immigration enforcement policy). 
 71. See id. at 8800  
Prioritize for removal . . . aliens who . . . (b) have been charged with 
any criminal offense, where such charge has not been resolved; (c) Have 
committed acts that constitute a chargeable criminal offense . . . (f) Are 
subject to a final order of removal, but who have not complied with 
their legal obligation to depart the United States . . . . 
 72. Exec. Order No. 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793 (Jan. 30, 2017). 
 73. Memorandum from U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. Sec’y John Kelly to U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection Acting Comm’r et al., on Enf’t of the Immigration 
Laws to Serve the Nat. Interest 2 (Feb. 20, 2017) (rescinding previous field 
guidance and memoranda from the Department of Homeland Security regarding 
immigration enforcement). 
 74. Memorandum from U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Immigration and 
Customs Enf’t Exec. Assoc. Dir. Matthew Albence to All Enforcement & Removal 
Operations Employees 1 (Feb. 21, 2017). 
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virtually all removable noncitizens as priorities for enforcement, 
regardless of their equities or circumstances. As Secretary Kelly 
emphasized, “If you’re here illegally, you should leave or you 
should be deported.”75 ICE Director Thomas Homan sounded the 
same theme: “There’s no population off the table. If you’re in this 
country illegally, we’re looking for you and we’re going to 
apprehend you.”76 
None of this has turned out to be empty posturing or rhetoric. 
Almost every day, news outlets publish stories on the Trump 
Administration’s immigration enforcement activities. These 
reports tell the stories of families torn apart, long-term residents 
suddenly detained, and the deportation of persons with extremely 
sympathetic circumstances.77 From fiscal year 2016 to fiscal year 
2017, immigration arrests of noncitizens without any criminal 
histories more than doubled, and the total number of immigration 
arrests rose by 42%.78 Especially significant is the toll taken on 
noncitizens who have woven themselves into the fabric of our 
society. The number of cases pending in immigration court 
involving noncitizens who have lived in the United States for many 
years—and thus have developed connections making the impact of 
deportation more significant—has dramatically increased.79 
                                                                                                     
 75. Kery Murakami, Immigrant Deportations Up Sharply Under Trump, 
MANKATO FREE PRESS (Aug. 19, 2017), http://www.mankatofreepress.com/news/ 
local_news/immigrant-deportations-up-sharply-under-trump/article_a2b7b8d3-
d00b-5839-9f1d-8de5d83b3696.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2018) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 76. Adam K. Raymond, Deportations Are Down Under Trump, But Arrests of 
Non-Criminal Immigrants Surge, N.Y. MAG. (Dec. 20, 2017), 
http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2017/12/deportations-are-down-as-immigra 
tion-arrests-surge.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2018) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 77. See, e.g., supra note 11 and accompanying text (documenting Magana 
Ortiz’s story). 
 78. See IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FISCAL 
YEAR 2017 ICE ENFORCEMENT AND REMOVAL OPERATIONS REPORT 2 (2017) (“[T]he 
number of administrative arrests rose from 77,806 to 110,568, a 42 percent 
increase.”); see also Aria Bendix, Immigration Arrests Are Up, But Deportation is 
Down Under Trump, But Arrests of Non-Criminal Immigrants Surge, N.Y. MAG. 
(Dec. 20, 2017) (reporting on a 150% increase in noncriminal immigration arrests 
from Jan. 25. 2017 to April 29, 2017).  
 79. See, e.g., Immigration Court Cases Now Involve More Long-Time 
Residents, TRAC IMMIGR. (Apr. 19, 2018), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/ 
reports/508/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2018) (comparing the number of immigration 
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According to data obtained by TRAC Immigration, of the new 
immigration court cases DHS filed in March 2018, for example, 
only 10% concerned new arrivals to the United States, while 43% 
had arrived two or more years ago.80 By way of contrast, “the 
proportion of individuals who had just arrived in new filings during 
the last full month of the Obama Administration (December 2016) 
made up 72%, and only 6% had been here at least two years.”81 
The other enforcement trend involves apparent retaliation 
against those who criticize or do not cooperate with immigration 
authorities.82 One aspect of this trend consists of the prioritization 
of enforcement resources within so-called “sanctuary” cities, where 
raids and other measures are designed to send a message to the 
offending jurisdiction as much as to net deportable noncitizens.83 
Another aspect of this development, and the one most pertinent to 
this Article, is reflected in DHS’s apparent effort to prioritize the 
removal of politically-active noncitizens who speak out against 
government policies.84 Ragbir, for instance, alleges that this form 
of retaliation drove ICE’s decision to remove him even before the 
                                                                                                     
cases involving new arrivals versus immigrants who had resided in the United 
States for at least two years) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 80. See id. (graphing the percentage of immigration cases involving new 
arrivals and immigrants in the United States for at least two years).  
 81. See id. (reporting that based on latest recorded entry dates alone, at least 
20% of cases filed since March 2018 involved immigrants who had been in the 
country for five years or more). 
 82. See, e.g., Walter Ewing, The Federal Government is Using Immigration 
Raids as Retaliation Against California, IMMIGR. IMPACT (Feb. 8, 2018), 
http://immigrationimpact.com/2018/02/08/government-immigration-raids-
california/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2018) (documenting increased immigration 
enforcement raids in response to California’s declaration as a “sanctuary state”) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 83. See id. (“[T]he recent raids were not simply an attempt to enforce federal 
immigration laws, but were also an act of retribution against a state government 
that dared not to transform its police officers into proxy immigration agents.”). 
 84. See, e.g., Immigrant Rights Leader Ravi Ragbir and Community 
Organizations File First Amendment Lawsuit Challenging the Targeting of 
Immigrant Rights Activists, NAT’L IMMIGR. PROJECT (Feb. 9, 2018), 
https://www.nationalimmigrationproject.org/pr/2018_9Feb_ragbir-v-homan.html 
(last visited Sept. 9, 2018) (challenging ICE’s enforcement against Ragbir as 
“retaliatory and discriminatory”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF . . . DEPORTATION 1443 
expiration of his current period of authorized stay and resolution 
of his pending motion to reopen his proceedings.85  
Ragbir’s case is by no means the only example of potentially 
retaliatory behavior by ICE. News reports suggest that an 
ever-growing number of seemingly “good hombres” may have been 
targeted for removal on the basis of First-Amendment-protected 
speech. The reports concern the following persons, many of whom 
are movement organizers and outspoken critics of the Trump 
Administration: 
Daniela Vargas, arrested by ICE when departing an 
immigrant-rights rally in Jackson, Mississippi (March 2017).86 
Arturo Hernando Garcia, an outspoken immigrant rights 
activist, detained by ICE in Colorado in April 2017. Supporters 
argue that the unexpected arrest is linked to Jeanette 
Vizguerra, who had taken refuge in the same church as Mr. 
Garcia.87 
Claudia Rueda, a college student who has protested deportation 
policies and engaged in immigration activism, allegedly 
arrested by ICE in retaliation for her activism (May 2017).88 
                                                                                                     
 85. See id. (“These high profile actions prompted Arnold & Porter and the 
New York University Immigrant Rights Clinic to file suit today to challenge 
federal immigration officials’ retaliatory and discriminatory enforcement of 
immigration laws against Mr. Ragbir and other immigrant rights activists on the 
basis of their protected political speech.”). 
 86. See John Burnett, See The 20+ Immigration Activists Arrested Under 
Trump, NPR (Mar. 16, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/03/16/591879718/see-the-
20-immigration-activists-arrested-under-trump (last visited Sept. 9, 2018) 
(“Daniela Vargas was leaving a rally in Jackson, Miss., where she had spoken in 
favor of undocumented rights. ICE pulled over the car she was riding in and 
arrested her because her DACA status had expired.”) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 87. See Jesse Paul, Arturo Hernandez Garcia Gets Back to Family, Work 
After Deportation Delayed, DENVER POST (May 4, 2017, 6:00 AM), 
https://www.denverpost.com/2017/05/04/arturo-hernandez-garcia-deportation-
delay/ (last updated May 4, 2017, 9:26 AM) (last visited Sept. 9, 2018) 
(“Immigrant advocates—and Hernandez Garcia himself—feel the arrest was 
possibly fueled by politics under President Donald Trump and potentially the 
notoriety of Jeanette Vizguerra, a Mexican woman who has taken sanctuary in 
the First Unitarian Society of Denver, the same church that harbored Hernandez 
Garcia.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).   
 88. See id. (“Claudia Rueda is an immigration activist and college student 
who protested U.S. deportation policies, as well as the arrest of her mother on 
drug smuggling charges. Rueda was arrested by immigration agents on May 18, 
1444 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1427 (2018) 
Siham Byah, arrested late in 2017, allegedly due to her political 
activism (November 2017).89 
Baltazar Aburto Gutierrez, detained in Washington by ICE 
after a news report published his criticism of his long-time 
partner’s deportation to Mexico. Agents allegedly told 
Gutierrez: “You’re the one from the newspaper.” (December 
2017).90 
Jean Montrevil, an immigrant-rights activist and co-leader of 
the New Sanctuary Coalition of NYC, arrested the same week 
as Ragbir and deported to Haiti (January 2018).91 
Maru Mora-Villalpando, allegedly targeted due to her political 
speech after ICE officials identified her through an interview 
she gave to a Seattle newspaper criticizing the agency 
(February 2018).92 
                                                                                                     
2017, and released 22 days later.”). 
 89. ‘No Warning Whatsoever.’ Mother from Nahant Taken into ICE Custody, 
WCVB (Nov. 8, 2017), http://www.wcvb.com/article/no-warning-whatsoever-
mother-from-nahant-taken-into-ice-custody/13453943 (last updated Nov. 8, 2017, 
6:59 PM) (last visited Sept. 9, 2018) (citing her outspoken criticism of the 
Moroccan dictatorship) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 90. See id. (“ICE agents arrested the Mexican shellfish worker in Ocean 
Park, Wash., in December 2017, after he was quoted in a newspaper complaining 
about his longtime partner's deportation to Mexico.”). 
 91. See John Burnett, See The 20+ Immigration Activists Arrested Under 
Trump, NPR (March 16, 2018, 10:30 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/03/16 
/591879718/see-the-20-immigration-activists-arrested-under-trump (last visited 
Sept. 9, 2018) (“On Jan. 3, Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents 
arrested Jean Motrevil, a prominent immigrant rights activist from Haiti who 
co-founded the New Sanctuary Coalition.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review); Katie Egan, Federal Crackdown on Immigration Activists 
Threatens to Chill Free Speech, ACLU (Jan. 30, 2018, 1:00 PM), https:// 
www.aclu.org/blog/free-speech/rights-protesters/federal-crackdown-immigration-
activists-threatens-chill-free (last visited Sept. 9, 2018) (“In New York, Jean 
Montrevil and Ravi Ragbir—both prominent immigrants’ rights activists and 
leaders of the New Sanctuary Coalition of New York City—were arrested within 
a week of each other.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 92. See Gene Johnson, Deportation Document Described Immigrant Activist’s 
Protests, AP NEWS (Feb 27, 2018), https://www.apnews.com/ec59e1c1780 
146cb9d3b96b669bb0926/Deportation-document-described-immigrant-activist's-
protests (last visited Sept. 9, 2018) (“‘I’m being put in deportation proceedings 
because of my political stance, because of my media presence, because I’ve utilized 
my freedom of speech,’ the activist, Maru Mora-Villalpando, told reporters . . . .”) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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Alejandra Pablos, an anti-Trump activist and a field coordinator 
for the National Latina Institute for Reproductive Health, held 
in detention since March 2018.93 
Six leaders from the immigrant-advocacy organization Migrant 
Justice—Victor Garcia Diaz, Alfredo Alcudia Gamas, Enrique 
Balcazar Sanchez, Zully Palacios Rodriguez, Yesenia 
Hernandez Ramos, and Esau Peche Ventura—detained and put 
into removal proceedings (March 2018).94 
And there are others.95  
To be sure, it may be difficult, in at least some of these cases, 
to parse the Administration’s enforcement motivations. Removal 
decisions concerning some of these individuals might simply flow 
from the mass deportation project that also ensnared Ortiz and 
countless others. Ragbir, for example, has a prior conviction 
                                                                                                     
 93. See id. (reporting that although Pablos has lawful permanent residence, 
she is potentially deportable on the basis of a past conviction for driving under 
the influence). 
 94. See Burnett, supra note 91  
[Migrant Justice] in Burlington, Vermont, has had six leaders arrested 
over a period of 14 months. All are undocumented. Migrant Justice 
advocates for dairy workers in Vermont. The arrested leaders are 
Victor Garcia Diaz, Alfredo Alcudia Gamas, Enrique Balcazar Sanchez, 
Zully Palacios Rodriguez, Yesenia Hernandez Ramos, and Esau Peche 
Ventura. 
 95. See, e.g., Cora Currier, FBI Pressed Detained Anti-ICE Activist for 
Information on Protests, Offering Immigration Help, INTERCEPT (Aug. 7, 2018, 
5:23 PM), https://theintercept.com/2018/08/07/fbi-pressed-detained-anti-ice-
activist-for-information-on-protests-offering-immigration-help/ (last visited Oct. 
16, 2018) (reporting on allegations that aspiring filmmaker Sergio Salazar was 
stripped of DACA status and targeted for removal solely on the basis of political 
activism critical of ICE policies) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review); Myrna Orozco & Noel Andersen, Sanctuary in the Age of Trump, 
SANCTUARY NOT DEPORTATION (Jan. 2018) (“In August 2017, as Araceli Velasquez 
prepared to publicly announce she had entered Sanctuary, ICE went to her 
husband’s workplace. The agent insisted on seeing and questioning Jorge and his 
co-workers, only leaving when the manager insisted that he show a warrant or 
leave.”); John Bear, Husband of Peruvian Woman Taking Sanctuary at Boulder 
Church Detained by ICE, DENVER POST (Jan. 11, 2018, 10:17 PM), 
https://www.denverpost.com/2018/01/11/ingrid-encalada-latorre-husband-
detained-immigration-boulder-sanctuary/ (last updated Jan. 12, 2018, 12:14 AM) 
(last visited Sept. 9, 2018) (reporting that ICE pulled over and arrested Eliseo 
Jurado Fernandez, the husband of Ingrid Encalada Latorre, a Peruvian woman 
who has taken sanctuary in a church in Boulder, Colorado) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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(however distant and arguably mitigated) as well as a final 
removal order, both of which bring him within the 
Administration’s new priorities and policies.96 Due to the necessity 
of his check-ins with ICE, he presented an easy target for 
enforcement. At the least, these circumstances give ICE the chance 
to explain away allegations of retaliatory intent.  
The general subject of retaliation in immigration cases is a 
large one and must be left for another day. For present purposes, 
the key point to be made is simple and narrow: An emerging 
picture suggests that some of the Trump Administration’s 
immigration actions are based, at least in part, on retaliation 
against vulnerable critics of the Administration’s policies.97 
III. The Significance of the Lower Court Decisions Today 
The judicial opinions of Judge Reinhardt and Judge Forrest 
discussed in Part II present powerful judicial condemnations of 
disproportionate, excessively cruel discretionary enforcement 
actions. Even though the court in each case found the government’s 
enforcement decisions to be statutorily justified, the opinions 
remain significant for a number of reasons. They provide beacons 
of both concern and of hope around which advocates have rallied. 
They signal to the political branches that the harsh results of 
current policy are pushing up against the bounds of legality. And 
they establish building blocks that other judges might put to use 
in constructing new legal theories for a more expansive judicial 
role in monitoring deportation policy in the future. This Part 
briefly elaborates on these points. 
First, judicial pronouncements such as these can bolster the 
resolve of lawyers, activists, and politicians who care about the 
achievement of justice in government decision making about the 
                                                                                                     
 96. See Decker Amended Declaration, supra note 47, at ¶ 14 (noting possible 
factors for Ragbir’s deportation); Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition 
to Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, 2–3, Ragbir v. Homan, 18-cv-
01159 (March 7, 2018) (arguing that current DHS guidance prioritizes removal of 
noncitizens subject to final orders of removal or convicted of criminal offenses). 
 97. See, e.g., supra Part II.B (examining cases where immigrant rights 
advocacy appeared to result in retaliatory enforcement action); see also notes 
86– 95 and accompanying text.  
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removal of noncitizens.98 Judge Reinhardt’s decision in the Ortiz 
case, for example, led to extensive media coverage and a 
professionally-produced video highlighting the injustice of his 
removal, narrated by Martin Sheen.99 The opinion also contributed 
to the introduction of a private bill that would allow Mr. Ortiz to 
return to the United States.100 Similarly, Judge Forrest’s ruling 
garnered extensive political and media attention, as reports 
continue to shine a light on the government’s efforts to remove 
Ravi Ragbir.101 Thus, although Ortiz did not secure the relief he 
sought through litigation, and Ragbir’s judicial fate remains 
uncertain, the fact that the courts’ opinions express moral 
condemnation of the government’s actions may eventually lead to 
success through other means.102  
Second, and relatedly, the decisions contribute to an ongoing 
process of inter-branch dialogue.103 Judicial review of agency 
action typically requires agency attorneys to explain and defend 
                                                                                                     
 98. See, e.g., Rosy Alvarez & Peter Rothberg, Andres Magana Ortiz’s 
Deportation Is Indefensible. Help Reverse It, NATION (Aug. 11, 2017), 
https://www.thenation.com/article/andres-magana-ortizs-deportation-is-
indefensible-help-reverse-it/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2018) (calling for action to 
return Ortiz to the United States) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 99. See id. (reporting through video the circumstances of Ortiz’s 
deportation).  
 100. See id. (“Representative Tulsi Gabbard also introduced a bill to make 
Magaña Ortiz eligible for legal, permanent residency in the United States.”).  
 101. See, e.g., Derek Hawkins, Federal Judge Blasts ICE for ‘Cruel’ Tactics, 
Frees Immigrant Rights Activist Ravi Ragbir, WASH. POST (Jan. 30, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2018/01/29/federal-
judge-blasts-ice-for-cruel-tactics-frees-immigrant-rights-activist-ravi-
ragbir/?utm_term=.b58487cc4b8b (last visited Oct. 2, 2018) (reporting on Judge 
Forrest’s Ragbir ruling) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 102. See Ortiz II, 857 F.3d 966, 968 (9th Cir. 2017) (commenting on the 
injustice of the government’s actions); Ragbir v. Sessions, No. 18-cv-236, 2018 WL 
623557, at *2–3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2018) (same). 
 103. Cf. Dan T. Coenen, The Rehnquist Court, Structural Due Process, and 
Semisubstantive Constitutional Review, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1281, 1366 (2002) 
(“After all, whenever the Court defines rights based on legislative choices, it 
obviously and openly involves nonjudicial authorities in the formulation of 
constitutional doctrine.”); Michael McCann, How the Supreme Court Matters in 
American Politics: New Institutionalist Perspectives 63, 71–73, in THE SUPREME 
COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST INTERPRETATIONS (Gillman 
& Clayton eds. 1999). 
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the legality of the government action at issue.104 That way, when 
judges review government action and then publish opinions, there 
is an information-generating effect that can have positive 
consequences (even if the particular action is upheld).105  
The opinions in Ortiz and Ragbir signal to the current 
Administration—and to congressional overseers as well—that 
some immigration enforcement actions are highly problematic.106 
Notably, this message can have real content even if courts remain 
unwilling or unable to police particular forms of executive actions. 
This is so in part because legislatures and the executive have a 
duty to act constitutionally even if the judiciary does not fully 
enforce those obligations.107 While it remains to be seen whether 
judicial scolding will temper this Administration’s efforts, and, in 
particular, encourage more equitable enforcement 
decision-making in future cases, such an outcome is possible—at a 
retail level if not as a matter of agency policy—and more likely to 
occur as more problems are brought to light.108 In addition, these 
sorts of judicial decisions signal to this or a future Congress that 
legal reform is necessary.109 If current law allows results so 
disproportionate that multiple federal judges choose to devote 
scarce time to disparaging them in the pages of the federal 
                                                                                                     
 104. See David S. Rubenstein, Taking Care of the Rule of Law, 86 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 101, 158 (2018) (“Judicial review, however, requires the executive branch 
to defend its legal reasoning in ways that discourse in other public forums 
cannot.”). 
 105. See id. (“The case studies presented in this Article provide important 
examples of how judicial review can pierce political rhetoric . . . . The 
information-generating effects of judicial review continue under the Trump 
Administration.”). 
 106. See, e.g., Ragbir, 2018 WL 623557, at *2 (describing the government’s 
actions as “unnecessarily cruel,” shocking, and unusual).  
 107. See LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE IN PLAINCLOTHES 84–92 (2004); Jason 
A. Cade, Policing the Immigration Police, 113 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 180, 
189– 96 (2013) [hereinafter Cade, Policing] (discussing how gaps in judicial 
enforcement of constitutional provisions stemming from doctrines of deference 
should be filled by the other branches’ independent duties to uphold the 
Constitution). 
 108. Cf. Cade, Sanctuaries, supra note 68 (discussing situations in which 
resistance to federal immigration enforcement efforts led to more equitable 
treatment in at least some individual cases). 
 109. Cf. Cade, Policing, supra note 107, at 189–96 (explaining why the 
political branches should act constitutionally even when the judicial branch’s 
oversight is limited by jurisdictional or justiciability doctrines). 
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reporters, this push for modifications of the underlying laws to 
avoid such results may gain strength.  
Finally, and perhaps most important, these decisions, and 
others like them, lend support to the idea that these cases involve 
enforceable substantive rights.110 In cases involving less thorny 
issues of judicial review,111 they thus may provide the scaffolding 
for building out constitutional doctrines that courts can invoke to 
provide equity-based relief. In this way, the decisions may 
represent a sort of “decisional foreshadowing.”112 The next Part 
points to some of the relevant jurisprudence that could lead courts 
to take further steps along this path. 
IV. The Significance of the Lower Court Decisions Tomorrow 
The concept of “proportionality” refers to the fit between the 
severity of a sanction and the gravity of the underlying offense, 
tempered by any mitigating or exacerbating factors.113 
Proportionality presents a tricky problem in immigration law. The 
enforcement of federal immigration law against noncitizens 
residing inside the United States has long produced harsh 
results.114 For over a century, the courts have afforded the political 
branches wide latitude in formulating and executing the rules that 
                                                                                                     
 110. Cf. Jenny S. Martinez, Process and Substance in the “War on Terror,” 108 
COLUM. L. REV. 1013, 1029 (2008) (observing that the Court’s enemy combatant 
decisions are like “signposts directing the traveler to continue toward an 
eventual, more significant fork in the road”). 
 111. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) (2012) (cabining judicial review of DHS decisions 
“to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders”). 
 112. Michael Coenen, Combining Constitutional Clauses, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 
1067, 1107 (2016). 
 113. See generally Austin Lovegrove, Proportionality Theory, Personal 
Mitigation, and the People’s Sense of Justice, 69 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 321, 330 (2010) 
(“[T]he severity of the punishment should be proportionate to the seriousness of 
the offence in question; but it also should be appropriate, having regard to the 
offender’s personal mitigation.”); Michael J. Wishnie, Immigration Law and the 
Proportionality Requirement, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 415, 416 (2012) 
(“Proportionality is the notion that the severity of a sanction should not be 
excessive in relation to the gravity of an offense.”). 
 114. See, e.g., Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 US 580, 596 (1952) (upholding 
an act allowing for the deportation of legal aliens for their membership in the 
Communist Party); Fong Yu Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 732 (1893) 
(affirming the dismissal of three writs of habeas corpus). 
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govern the deportation of noncitizens.115 Moreover, even in 
regulatory contexts outside of immigration law—such as the 
administration of criminal penalties—courts rarely review 
punishments on proportionality grounds.116 Because of this 
pattern of judicial deference, commentators advocating for more 
proportional penalties in immigration law have tended to focus on 
legislative reforms.117  
Nevertheless, decisions like the ones considered in this Article 
may move the needle toward a more active judicial role in 
proportionality review. This is all the more true in light of doctrinal 
developments taking place both inside and outside of immigration 
law. In particular, challenges to government action on the basis of 
combined constitutional concerns have gained a foothold in ways 
that may be relevant to the deportation field. In the following 
sections, I outline some of the key legal principles that may guide 
future courts. 
One clarification before proceeding. I do not aim here to set out 
a precise formula for determining when a particular removal 
action violates the principle of proportionality. Rather, my more 
modest ambition is simply to lay out the tools that advocates and 
courts might employ to evaluate proportionality in appropriate 
cases. Through the adjudication of specific facts with these 
principles, standards may well develop. The overarching point, 
however, is simply that a commitment to proportional treatment 
requires someone in the process to meaningfully engage with the 
                                                                                                     
 115. See, e.g., Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary 
Power, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 559 (1990) (quoting the Harisiades Court for its 
assertion that immigration and deportation policies are “so exclusively entrusted 
to the political branches of government as to be largely immune from judicial 
inquiry or interference”). 
 116. See Josh Bowers, Plea-Bargaining’s Baselines, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1083, 1090 (2016) (“For the Court, inquiries into proportionality and purpose are 
just too murky . . . .”); Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Law in an Age of 
Proportionality, 124 YALE L.J. 3094, 3096 (2015) (identifying the lack of 
proportionality based review in the United States as a general matter but noting 
its use in Eighth Amendment cases). 
 117. See Juliet Stumpf, Fitting Punishment, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1683, 
1729–41 (2009) (proposing legislative reforms to immigration policy to enhance 
proportionality); Angela Banks, Problems, Possibilities, and Pragmatic Solutions: 
Proportional Deportation, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1651, 1672–76 (2009) (“[L]egislative 
and administrative reforms are necessary to protect against grossly excessive 
deportations.”). 
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severity of the removal sanction as applied to particularized 
facts.118 When differently-situated individuals are punished 
equally, the rationality of the removal system is at stake and the 
potential for disproportionality skyrockets.119 
A. Fifth Amendment Proportionality Review 
A still nascent body of scholarship has begun to explore 
whether federal courts have the authority to review removal orders 
on proportionality grounds. Michael Wishnie, for example, has 
argued that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause might 
justify proportionality review in least some deportation contexts.120 
Angela Banks has advanced a similar claim.121 The Supreme Court 
has found that the Fifth Amendment sometimes requires 
proportionality review of civil sanctions.122 A key threshold 
                                                                                                     
 118. Cf. Lockette v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 608 (1978) (“To meet constitutional 
requirements, a death penalty statute must not preclude consideration of relevant 
mitigating evidence.”); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112–15 (1982) (“Just 
as a state may not by statute preclude the sentencer from considering any 
mitigating factor, neither may the sentencer refuse to consider, as a matter of 
law, any relevant mitigating evidence.”); Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 397–
99 (1987) (holding that failure to consider non-statutory mitigating evidence of 
family background and rehabilitation violated the rule established in 
both Eddings and Lockette).  
 119. Cf. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, POLICY VIEWS ABOUT MANDATORY MINIMUM 
SENTENCES (2011) (“But when the offenders subject to a mandatory minimum are 
not similarly situated, the elimination of disparity creates a form of unfairness 
that often is even more troubling—excessive uniformity.”). 
 120. See Wishnie, supra note 113, at 418 (“Nevertheless, a court should set 
aside a removal order as constitutionally impermissible in the rare case where 
the punishment of the removal order is grossly disproportionate to the underlying 
misconduct, just as the Fifth and Eighth Amendments require in other 
contexts.”). 
 121. See Banks, supra note 117, at 1652 (“I offer an alternative basis for 
constitutional restraints on deportation: that the Fifth Amendment requires civil 
punitive measures to be proportionate. The Fifth Amendment protects against 
arbitrary government action procedurally and substantively.”). The Takings 
Clause similarly has been interpreted to require “rough proportionality” between 
zoning permit conditions and the consequences of the proposed use of the 
property. See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 599 
(2013) (“[A] unit of government may not condition the approval of a land-use 
permit on the owner's relinquishment of a portion of his property unless there is 
a ‘nexus’ and ‘rough proportionality’ between the government's demand and the 
effects of the proposed land use.”). 
 122. See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447 (1989) (“[Double jeopardy] 
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consideration is whether any part of the sanction is intended to be 
punitive.123 Civil sanctions that are solely remedial in nature 
would not be subject to proportionality constraints under the 
Court’s due process precedents, but if there is a punitive 
component to the sanction then proportionality review would be 
appropriate.124 
The Court primarily developed these principles in a series of 
cases assessing the appropriateness of hefty punitive damages in 
civil tort cases.125 Such damages must be “both reasonable and 
proportionate to the amount of harm to the plaintiff and to the 
general damages recovered.”126 In general, the Court has made 
clear that where punitive damage sanctions are “grossly excessive” 
in relation to the state’s interests, they reach a level of 
arbitrariness that violates the substantive due process required by 
the Fifth Amendment.127 In BMW v. Gore,128 the Court set forth 
“guideposts” for case-by-case proportionality review of punitive 
civil sanctions: (1) the reprehensibility of the offense; (2) the ratio 
between the harm caused by the offense and the sanction; and (3) a 
comparison between the penalty and other civil or criminal 
                                                                                                     
protection is intrinsically personal. Its violation can be identified only by 
assessing the character of the actual sanctions imposed on the individual by the 
machinery of the state.”).  
 123. See id. at 447–48 (comparing remedial and punitive sanctions for double 
jeopardy purposes).  
 124. See Banks, supra note 117, at 1656 (“[T]he key question in determining 
whether or not a sanction is punishment is not whether it is criminal or civil, but 
whether it is remedial or punitive. Punitive measures in both contexts are subject 
to constitutional limitations.”); Wishnie, supra note 113, at 425–26 (“[T]he 
decisive classification for proportionality review is whether a sanction is remedial 
or punitive. If deportation is wholly remedial, without any punitive element, then 
proportionality review is not required by the Constitution.”). 
 125. See, e.g., BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574–85 (1996) 
(laying out three “guideposts” for whether a damage award is excessive and 
punitive). 
 126. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 426 (2003). 
 127. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 517 U.S. at 568; see also Pac. Mut. Life Ins. v. 
Haslip, 23 U.S. 1, 23 (1991) (noting that a damage award’s gross excessiveness is 
an “important substantive due process concern”). 
 128. 517 U.S. 559 (1996). 
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sanctions that could be imposed.129 In State Farm v. Campbell,130 
the Court went so far as to set forth a readily administrable 
“single-digit ratio” rule of thumb for assessing disproportionality 
in this context.131  
To be sure, courts might be willing to apply kindred principles 
in reviewing removal decisions only if those sanctions qualify as 
“punitive” in nature. But in fact, strong reasons support applying 
that label in this context. In deportation proceedings, there are 
typically two sanctions at issue: the deportation order itself, and 
the various statutory bars to reentry that follow from prior 
immigration violations. Moreover, with regard to each of these 
sanctions, Congress’s underlying intent is rather clear. To begin 
with, regarding deportation itself, the sanction of banishment has 
long been used to punish both citizens and noncitizens found to 
have engaged in unlawful activity.132 While the Court has taken 
pains to avoid formally characterizing deportation as a direct 
sanction for criminal activity, thereby avoiding the constitutional 
requirement of criminal procedure rights,133 its functional use as a 
kind of punishment has continued to the present day in the United 
States, as illustrated through extensive legislation in the late 
twentieth century that expanded the kinds of criminal activity 
leading to removal and that narrowed or eliminated discretionary 
relief in many cases.134  
                                                                                                     
 129. See id. at 575–85 (laying out three “guideposts” for whether a damage 
award is excessive and punitive). 
 130. 538 U.S. 408 (2003). 
 131. See id. at 410 (“[F]ew awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between 
punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due 
process.”). 
 132. See DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN 
HISTORY 39–43, 74–83 (2007) (describing how convicts historically were 
sometimes subject to banishment); Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of 
Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469, 513 (2007) (“From ancient Rome to eighteenth and 
nineteenth century Britain, France, and Russia, common forms of criminal 
punishment included exile, banishment, and transportation (particularly by 
Britain to the American and Australian colonies).”). 
 133. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594 (1952) (“Deportation, 
however severe its consequences, has been consistently classified as a civil rather 
than a criminal procedure.”). 
 134. See generally, e.g., Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 
1996, Pub. L. No. 104–132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996); Illegal Immigration Reform and 
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The Supreme Court in cases both new and old has recognized 
deportation as a “particularly severe ‘penalty.’”135 In Padilla v. 
Kentucky,136 for example, the Court observed that it is “‘most 
difficult’ to divorce the penalty [of deportation] from the 
conviction.”137 In Dada v. Mukasey,138 the Court likewise noted “the 
penalties attendant to deportation,” including the re-entry bars.139 
Lower courts also have routinely characterized deportation and 
reentry bars as penalties.140 
Banks and Wishnie have identified further support in the 
legislative record for the conclusion that these immigration 
sanctions were intended to be punitive.141 Senator William Roth 
explained that an intent behind the 1996 amendments was to 
make “more crimes punishable by deportation.”142 Similarly, the 
                                                                                                     
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996). 
Both Acts significantly (1) widened crime-related grounds for deportation, 
especially through the definitions of so-called “aggravated felonies,” and (2) 
constricted equitable relief for noncitizens deportable on these grounds. See 
generally Jason A. Cade, Enforcing Immigration Equity, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 661 
(2015); Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment: Some 
Thoughts About Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1889, 
1890– 91 (2000) (“This situation is the result of some fifteen years of 
relatively sustained attention to this issue, which culminated in two 
exceptionally harsh laws: the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 
1996 (AEDPA) and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility 
Act of 1996 (IIRIRA).”). 
 135. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 365, 373 (2010) (quoting Fong Yue Ting v. 
United States, 149 U.S. 698, 740 (1893)); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 147 
(1945) (“As stated by Mr. Justice Brandeis speaking for the Court in Ng Fung Ho 
v. White, deportation may result in the loss ‘of all that makes life worth living.’”) 
(internal citation omitted). 
 136. 559 U.S. 365 (2010). 
 137. Id. at 366. 
 138. 554 U.S. 1 (2008). 
 139. Id. at 11. 
 140. See Wishnie, supra note 113, at 434 (collecting cases including Dada). 
 141. See id. at 433–34 (recounting Chair of the House Judiciary Committee 
Hyde’s characterization of immigration sanctions as punitive); Banks, supra note 
117, at 1669 (“Not only is deportation in these cases justified as a mechanism for 
retribution, deterrence, and incapacitation, historically it has been understood as 
punishment, and the legislative history of these particular deportation grounds 
indicate a desire to punish.”). 
 142. Lindsay Macdonald, Why the Rule-of-Law Dictates that the Exclusionary 
Rule Should Apply in Full Force to Immigration Proceedings, 69 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
291, 304 n.117 (2014) (“According to Senator Roth, for example, IIRIRA expanded 
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Chair of the House Judiciary Committee, Henry Hyde, explained 
that the purpose behind the reentry bars was “to validate our 
immigration laws, and to put some penalty on people who cross 
into our country illegally.”143 Other legislators concurred in these 
sentiments.144 
Because removal orders and the statutory bars on lawful 
return to the United States are appropriately characterized as 
penalties, they implicate substantive due process concerns. 
Accordingly, Professor Banks has argued that punitive 
enforcement actions against lawful permanent residents should, in 
some cases, be deemed unconstitutional for proportionality 
reasons. Professor Wishnie expanded on this analysis to 
encompass unauthorized noncitizens with compelling equities. No 
less important, he has identified a statutory hook for 
proportionality review in a provision of the INA requiring 
immigration judges to review and enter a judgment of removal, 
which he argues must be read to incorporate proportionality 
principles to avoid an unconstitutional application of law.145  
In sum, Fifth Amendment due process offers an avenue by way 
of which claims of disproportionate immigration penalties might 
be considered. Applying this doctrine in cases like Ortiz’s might 
well have justified more robust judicial intervention.146 In the next 
subpart, I add to the mix a quick survey of recent Supreme Court 
case law regarding deportation challenges. Because this 
jurisprudence has a proportionality-sensitive cast, it offers further 
                                                                                                     
the grounds of deportation ‘to include more crimes punishable by deportation.’”). 
 143. Immigration Control and Financial Responsibility Act of 1996: Hearing 
of H. Judiciary Comm., 104th Cong. (1995). 
 144. See, e.g., id. (statement of Rep. Elton Gallegly that “if we don’t have 
penalties for illegal immigration, for heaven’s sakes, how are we ever going to 
deal with this issue?”); id. (statements of Rep. Howard Berman that the unlawful 
presence bars impose “a very harsh penalty” and that “[t]here is no doubt a 10 
year bar is a penalty”).  
 145. See Wishnie, supra note 113, at 441–45 (arguing that the canon of 
constitutional doubt requires construing 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(1)(A)—an INA 
provision directing that “[a]t the conclusion of the proceeding the immigration 
judge shall decide whether an alien is removable from the United States”—to 
require proportionality review). 
 146. See supra Part II.A (explaining why a judicial stay of the removal order 
in Ortiz’s case would have avoided a ten-year bar to lawful reentry based on his 
U.S. citizen spouse’s family petition). 
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support for judicial adoption of a proportionality-based due process 
restraint on removal orders. 
B. Proportionality-Enhancing Developments 
Despite the general reluctance of courts to enter the territory 
of equity-balancing, it is far from clear that the Court is closed to 
the idea of proportionality review in deportation cases. Indeed, in 
the last fifteen years, the Court has in substance recognized that 
removal of noncitizens with no path to status, or who have a 
criminal history, will sometimes be inappropriate on equitable or 
humanitarian grounds. More specifically, the Court has issued 
many rulings that structure the system so that proportionality 
concerns can be weighed at some point in the process, whether by 
federal or non-federal actors. This overarching doctrinal theme 
may help support the future development of a generalized 
constitutional principle of substantive proportionality review. 
The survey begins with Arizona v. United States,147 in which 
the Court struck down, as preempted by federal law, most of the 
challenged portions of Arizona’s omnibus immigration 
enforcement bill.148 In so doing, Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the 
majority stressed the “immediate human concerns” raised by 
immigration enforcement decisions.149 The Court candidly 
acknowledged that “[r]eturning an alien to his own country may be 
deemed inappropriate even where he has committed a removable 
offense or fails to meet the criteria for admission.”150 In other 
words, removal might be a disproportionate sanction for the 
underlying immigration violation. Accordingly, the Court focused 
on the need to protect federal choices regarding the use of equitable 
discretion from state disruption.151 To be sure, nothing in the 
                                                                                                     
 147. 567 U.S. 387 (2012). 
 148. See id. at 393 (“The United States filed this suit against Arizona, seeking 
to enjoin [the omnibus bill] as preempted.”). 
 149. Id. at 396. 
 150. Id.  
 151. See Jason A. Cade, Judging Immigration Equity: Deportation and 
Proportionality in the Supreme Court, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1029, 1047–49 (2017) 
(“In Arizona, however, the Court declined to employ the 
states-can-mirror-federal-law reasoning, focusing instead on the need to protect 
federal choices regarding prosecutorial discretion from disruption.”). 
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decision mandates the application of proportionality principles. 
Even so, the Court at least acknowledged that a noncitizen’s formal 
deportability is not dispositive to the question of whether he or she 
should be removed.152  
The Court’s Padilla decision also sought to mitigate unfair 
deportations by requiring that defense counsel accurately convey 
the immigration consequences of a potential conviction to his or 
her client.153 Repeatedly emphasizing that deportation is a “strict 
penalty,”154 Justice Stevens’s opinion for the majority explicitly 
highlighted how the Court’s ruling would enable and incentivize 
defense attorneys to “plea bargain creatively with the prosecutor 
in order to craft a conviction and sentence that reduce the 
likelihood of deportation, as by avoiding a conviction for an offense 
that automatically triggers the removal consequence.”155 The 
Court thus expanded the equitable frame beyond immediate 
criminal proceedings to incorporate deportation consequences. 
In another series of cases, the Court has required and refined 
a “categorical approach” to determining the immigration 
consequences of convictions.156 In general, these cases have 
rejected the government’s efforts to interpret criminal deportation 
categories expansively, by requiring a strict categorical match 
between the elements of the penal offense and the relevant 
                                                                                                     
 152. See Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 396 (2012) (“Returning an 
alien to his own country may be deemed inappropriate even where he has 
committed a removable offense or fails to meet the criteria for admission.” 
(emphasis added)). 
 153. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371 (2010) (“It is quintessentially 
the duty of counsel to provide her client with available advice about an issue like 
deportation and the failure to do so ‘clearly satisfies the first prong of 
the Strickland analysis.’”). 
 154. Id. at 365, 366, 373. 
 155. Id. at 373. 
 156. See, e.g., Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1211 (2018) (recognizing 
that the “categorical approach” is used to determine if a conviction “falls within 
the ambit” of the residual clause); Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1986 (2015) 
(“The categorical approach ‘has a long pedigree in our Nation’s immigration law.’” 
(citing Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 191 (2013))); Carachuri-Rosendo v. 
Holder, 560 U.S. 563, 577 n.11 (2010) (distinguishing that case from Nijhawan v. 
Holder, 557 U.S. 29 (2009), which rejected the categorical approach); Lopez v. 
Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 47, 60 (2006) (“In sum, we hold that a state offense constitutes 
a ‘felony punishable under the Controlled Substances Act’ only if it proscribes 
conduct punishable as a felony under that federal law.”). 
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immigration statutory provision.157 These rulings, the Court has 
noted, allow noncitizens “to enter ‘safe harbor’ guilty pleas” that 
preserve possibilities for equitable relief in immigration court or 
sometimes avoid immigration sanctions altogether.158 At bottom, 
the jurisprudence has created proportionality-enhancing effects by 
rejecting overly broad definitions of the criminal-removal 
grounds.159  
In these and other cases, which I explore in more detail 
elsewhere,160 the Court seems to have anticipated that 
discretionary choices would help ameliorate the disproportionate 
effects of an overbroad and unforgiving legislative scheme. At least 
to this extent, a wide body of recent Supreme Court case law has 
evinced solicitude for proportionality concerns in deportation 
proceedings. The Court thus has recognized that claims to 
membership—and membership rights—in the American 
community are broader than strictly contemplated by code law, 
including for persons with no path to lawful status and persons 
with criminal histories.161 Although these precedents do not firmly 
establish substantive proportionality review, they lay groundwork 
for future expansion. This past is prelude to a future, more 
proportionality-conscious judicial approach.  
                                                                                                     
 157. See Cade, supra note 151, at 1060–69 (cataloging decisions upholding the 
categorical approach and explaining its benefits); Alina Das, The Immigration 
Penalties of Criminal Convictions: Resurrecting Categorical Analysis in 
Immigration Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1669, 1725–27 (2011) (explaining the 
“implications of deviating from a Categorical Analysis”). 
 158. Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1987 (2015) (quoting Jennifer Lee 
Koh, The Whole Better Than the Sum: A Case for the Categorical Approach to 
Determining the Immigration Consequences of Crime, 26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 257, 
307 (2012)). 
 159. See Cade, supra note 151, at 1104 (“The categorical approach cases do 
mitigate the harshness of the aggravated felony provisions by rejecting broad 
interpretations of the criminal removal grounds. In this way, as a practical matter 
many of the cases do have a substantive, proportionality-enhancing effect.”). 
 160. See id. at 1071–81 (discussing the Court’s “second-look” and arbitrary 
enforcement cases).  
 161. See id. at 1095–100 (explaining “the significance of this expansive 
conception of which persons have some claim to continued presence that the Court 
believes is appropriately evaluated prior to the imposition of banishment”); see, 
e.g., Padilla, 559 U.S. at 384–85 (expanding Sixth Amendment rights for 
non-resident defendants). 
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C. Arbitrary Enforcement Review 
To the extent the Administration’s removal policies fail to 
rationally distinguish between potential targets, another Supreme 
Court development in the immigration context may prove to be 
increasingly relevant and is worthy of careful assessment: 
arbitrary and capricious review.162 In Judulang v. Holder,163 thus 
far a little-examined decision issued in 2011, the Court employed 
arbitrary and capricious (or “hard-look”) review to evaluate one 
very particularized agency immigration policy.164 The case 
concerned INA Section 212(c), which authorized discretionary 
relief from crime-based deportation. Although Congress repealed 
this waiver in 1996, its protection nonetheless has remained 
applicable so long as the relevant conviction predated the repeal.165 
Because the waiver provision was located in the INA’s 
inadmissibility section, as opposed to the deportation section, the 
agency initially applied it only in cases involving persons seeking 
entry (or re-entry) to the United States.166 Litigation challenging 
the agency’s failure to extend comparable equitable relief to lawful 
permanent residents facing deportation resulted in a revised policy 
making Section 212(c) available in deportation cases as well, but 
only if the operative removal category also had an equivalent or 
comparable provision in the INA’s inadmissibility section.167  
                                                                                                     
 162. See generally 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2012) (providing authority to courts to 
“set aside agency action” if “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 
otherwise not in accordance with law”). Three recent lower court decisions have 
applied arbitrary and capricious review in the immigration context to find 
unlawful the Trump Administration’s revocation of the Deferred Action for 
Childhood Arrivals program. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec., 279 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1029 (N.D. Cal. 2018); Batalla Vidal v. 
Nielson, 291 F. Supp. 3d 260, 269 (E.D.N.Y. 2018); NAACP v. Trump, 298 F. Supp. 
3d 209, 215–16 (D.D.C. 2018). 
 163. 565 U.S. 42 (2011). 
 164. See id. at 45 (“This case concerns the Board of Immigration 
Appeals’ . . . policy for deciding when resident aliens may apply to the Attorney 
General for relief from deportation under a now-repealed provision of the 
immigration laws.”). 
 165. See id. at 48 (recounting how the Court revived Section 212(c) in INS v. 
St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 326 (2001)). 
 166. See id. at 47 (explaining how Section 212(c) applied to aliens seeking 
entry or re-entry). 
 167. See id. at 46–50 (explaining the agency’s implementation of 212(c) and 
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In due course, this “comparable grounds” policy was also 
challenged in a case that found its way to the Supreme Court. In 
that case, the Justices unanimously agreed that the government’s 
“comparable grounds” policy resulted in an “arbitrary and 
capricious” restriction on eligibility for equitable relief from 
removal for noncitizens charged under any deportation provisions 
that did not have inadmissibility equivalents.168 The Court’s 
opinion, authored by Justice Kagan, expressed discomfort with an 
enforcement approach that failed to weigh noncitizens’ “fitness to 
remain in the country.”169 As Justice Kagan explained, the agency’s 
comparable grounds approach “does not rest on any factors 
relevant to whether an alien . . . should be deported.”170 This was 
problematic because, in the Court’s view, enforcement relief 
provisions like Section 212(c) should be tied to a noncitizen’s 
equitable merit,171 taking into account “the alien’s prior offense or 
his other attributes and circumstances.”172 To do otherwise would 
result in impermissible arbitrariness.173  
Notably, the Court highlighted a link between general agency 
policies that disregard individuals’ equities in this country and 
individual prosecutorial enforcement decisions based on those 
policies: “[U]nderneath this layer of arbitrariness lies yet another, 
because the outcome of the Board’s comparable-grounds analysis 
itself may rest on the happenstance of an immigration official’s 
charging decision.”174 Because convictions frequently implicate 
more than one deportation category, ICE agents can choose which 
of several charges to pursue, some of which might appear only the 
in the deportation section of the INA.175 Thus, through 
                                                                                                     
related litigation). 
 168. See id. at 55, 59–60 (holding that the agency’s comparable grounds policy 
violated the Administrative Procedures Act). 
 169. Id. at 55. 
 170. Id. at 58 (emphasis added). 
 171. See id. at 56 (emphasizing that the agency’s comparable grounds 
approach to determining eligibility for equitable relief “has nothing to do with 
whether a deportable alien . . . merits the ability to seek a waiver” and in fact “is 
as extraneous to the merits of the case as a coin flip would be”). 
 172. Id. at 55. 
 173. See id. at 56 (comparing the process to “a coin flip”). 
 174. Id. at 57. 
 175. See id. at 58 (“And the Government has provided no reason to think that 
immigration officials must adhere to any set scheme in deciding what charges to 
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discretionary charging decisions alone, a front-line official could 
intentionally (or arbitrarily) foreclose the possibility of equitable 
relief pursuant to Section 212(c) by invoking a removal provision 
that lacked a comparable inadmissibility ground.176 The Court 
found intolerable the likelihood of injustice created by such an 
arbitrariness-laden scheme: “An alien appearing before one official 
may suffer deportation; an identically situated alien appearing 
before another may gain the right to stay in the country.”177 
“Deportation decisions,” the Court admonished, “cannot be made a 
‘sport of chance.’”178 
All of this may seem a bit far into the weeds of a particular 
statutory tangle, but there are two key points for present purposes. 
First, the Court in Judulang reviewed the agency’s enforcement 
scheme as a product of both agency policy and individual 
prosecutorial decisions, in light of the separate “layer[s] of 
arbitrariness” they create.179 This framing could well apply to 
other immigration enforcement activities, including those 
highlighted in this Article. Second, the Court scrutinized whether 
the agency’s approach to enforcement, through both policy and 
discretionary enforcement actions, focused sufficiently on the 
“merits of the case.”180 Judulang thus broke new ground by 
applying “an independent evaluation of the merits of an 
immigration agency’s policy, rather than just a review of the 
                                                                                                     
bring, or that those officials are exercising their charging discretion with § 212(c) 
in mind.”). 
 176. See id. (explaining how an immigration official’s charging decision can 
be arbitrary). In Judulang’s case, for example, his conviction for involuntary 
manslaughter could be charged as either a “crime involving moral turpitude” 
removal ground or a “crime of violence” aggravated felony ground, or both. Id. at 
52–54. The crime involving moral turpitude has a comparable inadmissibility 
ground but the crime of violence aggravated felony does not, so the agency’s 
decision to charge him under the latter provision made him ineligible for 
discretionary relief. See id. at 52 (“As part of its decision, the BIA considered 
whether Judulang could apply for § 212(c) relief. It held that he could not do so 
because the “crime of violence” deportation ground is not comparable to any 
exclusion ground, including the one for crimes involving moral turpitude.”). 
 177. Id. at 58. 
 178. Id. at 59 (quoting Di Pasquale v. Karnuth, 158 F.2d 878, 879 (2d Cir. 
1947)). 
 179. Id. at 57. 
 180. Id. at 56. 
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rationality of the process employed in developing that policy.”181 
Importantly, the Justices went so far as to find that “rational 
operation of the immigration laws” requires attention to a 
noncitizen’s “fitness to remain in the country,” based on, for 
example, that person’s “prior offense or his other attributes and 
circumstances.”182 In other words, the Court suggested that the 
agency’s approach to implementation of the statute in the 
deportation context must reflect some attempt at normative 
balancing.  
Thus, to the extent that the government’s decisions to remove 
noncitizens like Ortiz or Ragbir can be traced to general agency 
policies that facilitate arbitrary or capricious results in individual 
cases—and in both matters the courts seemed to suggest that such 
a characterization would be appropriate—Judulang provides both 
an independent tool for judicial intervention, as well as additional 
support for the application of substantive due process. And while 
the Trump Administration’s removal policies may well be 
supportable by statutory authority, that fact does not foreclose a 
judicial finding of capriciousness. As Jennifer Koh has pointed out, 
“the mere fact that an agency’s organic statute permits a particular 
practice does not necessarily guarantee that it should clear the 
‘hard look’ threshold.”183 Statutory authorization is a necessary 
baseline for agency action, but courts must nevertheless go on to 
determine whether the agency’s implementation of that authority 
is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law.”184 In the deportation context, the Court 
explained in Judulang, the agency’s implementation of its 
                                                                                                     
 181. Jeffrey D. Stein, Delineating Discretion: How Judulang Limits Executive 
Immigration Policy-Making Authority and Opens Channels for Future 
Challenges, 27 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 35, 48 (2012). 
 182. Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 53–55 (2011). 
 183. See Jennifer Lee Koh, When Shadow Removals Collide: Searching for 
Solutions to the Legal Black Holes Created by Expedited Removal and 
Reinstatement, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 58) 
(applying the reasoning of Judulang to the government practice of reinstating 
prior expedited removal orders). 
 184. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2012); see also Animal Legal Def. Fund, Inc., v. Perdue, 
872 F.3d 602, 619 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“[T]he mere fact that a regulatory scheme is 
generally consistent with the agency’s authorizing statute does not shield each 
agency action taken under the scheme from arbitrary and capricious review.”); 
Koh, supra note 183, at 76–79 (discussing relevant case law). 
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statutory authority must contend with the “high stakes for an alien 
who has long resided in this country” and a normative evaluation 
of factors such as his “fitness to remain in the country.”185 
To be sure, Judulang involved a challenge under 
Administrative Procedures Act, and did not directly consider a 
constitutional due process challenge.186 Nevertheless, the opinion 
reveals much about the Justices’ thinking with respect to removal 
decisions that arbitrarily subject some noncitizens to removal, but 
not similarly situated others. This kind of hard-look scrutiny is 
also fitting when the government’s policy approaches are 
excessively uniform, treating differently-situated persons the 
same.187 And these underlying concerns may well influence future 
decisions based on new varieties of due process or equal protection 
challenges.  
D. Retaliatory Enforcement and the First Amendment 
Ragbir and others have alleged that the Trump 
Administration is specifically targeting them for enforcement in 
retaliation for their criticism of its policies.188 Retaliatory removal 
decisions based on protected speech raise distinct proportionality 
concerns.189 If enforcement choices in these cases thus function as 
sanctions on core political speech, does the First Amendment offer 
                                                                                                     
 185. Judulang, 565 U.S. at 55. 
 186. See id. at 52 (“This case requires us to decide whether the BIA’s policy 
for applying § 212(c) in deportation cases is ‘arbitrary [or] capricious’ under the 
Administrative Procedure Act . . . .”). 
 187. See supra note 119 and accompanying text (citing sources criticizing 
“excessive uniformity” in sanctions). 
 188. See supra Part II.B (discussing the Ragbir case and Ragbir’s First 
Amendment argument). 
 189. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 730 (2012) (Breyer, J., 
concurring) (“Ultimately the Court has had to determine whether the statute 
works speech-related harm that is out of proportion to its justifications.”); Michael 
Coenen, Of Speech and Sanctions: Toward a Penalty-Sensitive Approach to the 
First Amendment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 991, 999–1002 (2012) (explaining penalty-
sensitive free speech adjudication and arguing for its expansion in First 
Amendment law); Jackson, supra note 116, at 3105, 3140–41 (discussing 
proportionality in constitutional law generally, including First Amendment 
principles). 
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any protection? The issue is complex but here I will sketch some 
basic contours.  
Supreme Court case law to date is inconclusive—and 
inconsistent—with respect to First Amendment protections for 
noncitizens.190 In a handful of cases, the Court has said that 
noncitizens possess First Amendment rights. Bridges v. Wixon,191 
for example, ruled that a legal permanent resident residing in the 
United States for two decades could not be deported on the basis of 
his activities and affiliation with the Communist Party.192 In 
rejecting the government’s attempt to deport him pursuant to a 
removal category involving persons who advocate the violent 
overthrow of the government, the Court broadly stated that, 
“Freedom of speech and of press is accorded aliens residing in this 
country. So far as this record shows . . . the utterances made by 
him were entitled to that protection.”193 Similarly, in a 1953 case 
involving the government’s attempt to exclude on security grounds 
a lawful permanent resident who was returning from working 
abroad, the Court noted that the First Amendment, like the Fifth 
Amendment, does not distinguish between citizens and “resident” 
noncitizens.194 
These immigrant-protective precedents concerned lawfully 
present noncitizens, however, and case law concerning the First 
Amendment rights of unauthorized noncitizens is less settled.195 
The fundamental question of when unauthorized noncitizens can 
claim the protection of the First Amendment has yet to be 
                                                                                                     
 190. See generally Michael Kagan, When Immigrants Speak: The Precarious 
Status of Non-Citizen Speech Under the First Amendment, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1237 
(2016) (examining problematic areas of First Amendment law affecting 
noncitizens). 
 191. 326 U.S. 135 (1945). 
 192. See id. at 137–38, 157 (reversing the circuit court’s decision to deport 
Bridges).  
 193. Id. at 147–48.  
 194. See Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 n.5 (1953) (“Such 
rights include those protected by the First and the Fifth Amendments . . . . None 
of these provisions acknowledges any distinction between citizens and resident 
aliens. They extend their inalienable privileges to all ‘persons’ and guard against 
any encroachment on those rights by federal or state authority.”).  
 195. See Kagan, supra note 190, at 1244–53 (exploring cases dealing with the 
issue of whether certain Amendments apply to noncitizens). See generally Bluman 
v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 565 U.S. 1104 (2012) (affirming, without an opinion, a 
statutory ban on donations to candidates by all foreign nationals except LPRs). 
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definitively determined.196 In United States v. 
Verdugo-Urquidez,197 handed down in 1990, Justice Rehnquist’s 
plurality opinion stated that “the people” protected by various 
constitutional provisions “refers to a class of people who are part 
of a national community or who have otherwise developed 
sufficient connection with this country to be considered part of that 
community.”198 The meaning of that statement, as well as its 
weight in light of the facts of the case and Justice Kennedy’s key 
concurrence, remains contestable.199 Moreover, other Court 
precedent makes clear that persons without lawful immigration 
status residing in the United States can claim the protection of the 
Fourth and Fifth Amendments, which strongly supports a parallel 
First Amendment right.200 Nevertheless, the government has 
seized on Verdugo-Urquidez to argue that at least some 
unauthorized noncitizens lack constitutional protections afforded 
to “the people,” and that claim has made headway with some lower 
courts.201 
                                                                                                     
 196. See Kagan, supra note 190, at 1244–53 (exploring the meaning of “the 
people” in Supreme Court decisions). 
 197. 494 U.S. 259 (1990). 
 198. Id. at 265 (considering Fourth Amendment claim brought by a Mexican 
national whose home abroad in Mexico was searched by DEA agents). 
 199. See, e.g., Michael Wishnie, Immigrants and the Right to Petition, 78 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 667, 681–85 (2003) (demonstrating that the Framers intended “the 
people” to incorporate constitutional protections for non-LPR noncitizens); Cade, 
supra note 107, at 187–88 (arguing that Justice Kennedy’s key concurrence in 
Verdugo-Urquidez turned on the extraterritoriality of the search rather than the 
status of the defendant); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 278 
(1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“If the search had occurred in a residence within 
the United States, I have little doubt that the full protections of the Fourth 
Amendment would apply.”). 
 200. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 205 (1982) (making clear that 
undocumented children can bring a constitutional Equal Protection challenge to 
a state’s decision to exclude them from public school); Arizona v. United States, 
567 U.S. 387, 411–15 (2012) (making clear that undocumented noncitizens can 
raise Fourth Amendment challenges to unlawful detention); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 
118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (recognizing the constitutional Equal Protection rights 
of noncitizens); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 237 (1896) (recognizing 
that the Constitution’s criminal procedure protections apply to noncitizens); see 
also Cade, Policing, supra note 107, at 189 (pointing out that “eight Justices in 
Lopez-Mendoza agreed that the Fourth Amendment protects undocumented 
noncitizens”). 
 201. See Kagan, supra note 190, at 1245–49 (surveying relevant First 
Amendment jurisprudence); D. Carolina Núñez, Inside the Border, Outside the 
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Furthermore, in Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination 
Committee (AADC)202 the Court proclaimed that “[a]s a general 
matter, and assuredly in the context of claims such as those put 
forward in the present case—an alien unlawfully in this country 
has no constitutional right to assert selective enforcement as a 
defense against his deportation.”203 Despite the first-blush breadth 
of this statement, however, there are good reasons not to give it too 
much weight in the context of evaluating challenges to retaliatory 
enforcement efforts against noncitizens engaging in core political 
speech. First, the government in AADC had targeted members of 
the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, which was 
categorized as an international terrorist organization.204 Thus, the 
government’s foreign policy concerns were particularly weighty, 
and the activities it targeted seemed to fall outside the protection 
of the First Amendment altogether.205  
Second, the Court distinguished future cases in which “the 
alleged basis of discrimination is so outrageous that the foregoing 
considerations can be overcome.”206 It is unclear whether 
                                                                                                     
Law: Undocumented Immigrants and the Fourth Amendment, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 
85, 96–112 (2011) (surveying parallel developments in Fourth Amendment law).  
 202. 525 U.S. 471 (1999). 
 203. Id. at 488.  
 204. See id. at 473 (“[T]he Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
(PFLP), [is] a group that the Government characterizes as an international 
terrorist and communist organization.”). For an argument that the government’s 
terrorism designations can be highly politicized and problematic, see Gerald 
Neuman, Terrorism, Selective Deportation and the First Amendment After Reno 
v. AADC, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 313, 322–37 (2000) and Susan M. Akram & Kevin 
R. Johnson, Race, Civil Rights, and Immigration Law After September 11, 2001: 
The Targeting of Arabs and Muslims, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 295, 317–55   
(2002). 
 205. See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 591–92 (1952) (declining 
to extend First Amendment protections to members of a Communist group); 
Neuman, supra note 204, at 313 (“In Part III of the majority opinion, Justice 
Scalia stated that the First Amendment does not guarantee a defense of selective 
prosecution in deportation proceedings, or at least, that it does not guarantee such 
a defense in circumstances like those of the case at bar.”); Kagan, supra note 190, 
at 1280 (noting that under current law the PFLP’s “conduct could constitute the 
crime of providing material support to a terrorist organization under the 
Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996”).  
 206. Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 491 (1999). 
While the respondents alleged that “the INS was selectively enforcing 
immigration laws against them in violation of their First and Fifth Amendment 
rights,” id. at 474, the Court focused its analysis only on their claim that the 
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retaliatory enforcement against unauthorized noncitizens 
engaging in core, non-violent political speech on subjects of great 
public concern would meet this still-undefined “outrageous” 
threshold, thereby rendering invalid an otherwise valid removal 
order (or some other remedial action). But since the time that 
AADC was handed down, the Court has increasingly recognized 
“important constitutional limitations” on the government’s 
immigration powers, particularly with respect to the rights of 
persons who have already established ties within the United 
States.207  
Although arising in a different context, the Court’s recent 
decision in Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach,208 might be relevant 
to this inquiry. There, the Court held that claims of government 
retaliation on the basis of First Amendment protected activity are 
viable even where there has been a valid arrest supported by 
probable cause.209 While Lozman involved a civil rights claim 
following a criminal arrest, the Court’s analysis may still have 
implications for the immigration field. In particular, Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion for the majority noted that “criticisms of public 
officials” or other speech petitioning the government for policy 
changes are “high in the hierarchy of First Amendment values.”210 
If DHS is acting pursuant to a policy or pattern of retaliatory 
animus when it detains and deports outspoken noncitizens like 
Ravi Ragbir, a broad reading of Lozman further supports a First 
                                                                                                     
government was discriminating based on First Amendment protected activity, 
rather than Equal Protection. Id. at 475, 480, 487–92, 488 n.10. 
 207. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695 (2001) (opining that both 
executive and legislative immigration “power is subject to important 
constitutional limitations”); Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1686 
(2017) (holding that statute setting different residency requirements for U.S. 
citizen fathers and mothers seeking to transmit birthright citizenship to their 
non-marital children born outside the United States violates the Equal Protection 
Clause). See generally Cade, supra note 151, at 1049–82 (discussing cases 
illustrating the Court’s general evolution towards more protective rulings for 
noncitizens inside the United States). 
 208. 138 S. Ct. 1945 (2018). 
 209. See id. at 1955 (ruling that Lozman need not prove an absence of 
probable cause to proceed with his retaliatory arrest claim against the City). 
 210. Id. at 1954–55. For historical evidence that the Framers intended the 
constitutional right to petition to apply to undocumented noncitizens, see 
Wishnie, supra note 199. 
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Amendment defense notwithstanding the legality of those 
enforcement actions.211  
At the very least, the Court’s existing doctrine in this area does 
not foreclose the retaliatory enforcement claims brought by Ragbir 
and others. While there will often be difficulties regarding proof of 
motive, where these can be surmounted in particularly outrageous 
cases courts may well find the First Amendment prohibits the 
government from using deportation to silence its critics. In other 
words, the First Amendment provides another vehicle for 
assessing claims challenging the proportionality of imposing 
removal as retaliation for protected speech activities. And, as I 
explain in the next section, such claims are all the more likely to 
find a foothold where they connect up with other constitutional 
harms.  
E. Combining Constitutional Concerns 
The preceding discussion considered doctrinal developments 
that might support more searching proportionality review of 
removal decisions pursuant to the APA or constitutional 
safeguards provided by substantive due process or the First 
Amendment. As I have argued, courts may be able to incorporate 
proportionality principles in the removal context through the 
independent application of these principles. In this Part, I consider 
whether proportionality review might also find footing in cases 
that recognize judicially enforceable limitations rooted in a 
combination of constitutional protections. An emerging literature 
has begun to examine the implications of the Court’s so-called 
“hybrid rights” cases,212 which recognize and honor the “joint 
decisional force of two or more constitutional provisions.”213  
                                                                                                     
 211. See Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 138 S. Ct. 1945, 1951 (2018) 
(“Lozman’s claim is that, notwithstanding the presence of probable cause, his 
arrest at the city council meeting violated the First Amendment because the 
arrest was ordered in retaliation for his earlier, protected speech: his 
open-meetings lawsuit and his prior public criticisms of city officials.”). 
 212. See Dan T. Coenen, Freedom of Speech and the Criminal Law, 97 B.U. L. 
REV. 1533, 1595–1601 (2017) (discussing “hybrid rights” cases).   
 213. Coenen, supra note 112, at 1070; see also Kerry Abrams & Brandon L. 
Garrett, Cumulative Constitutional Rights, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1309, 1310–11 (2017) 
(listing examples of causes of action involving more than one constitutional 
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Obergefell v. Hodges214 illustrates the potential of 
hybrid-rights analysis.215 There, the Court held unconstitutional 
state laws prohibiting same-sex marriage.216 To reach this 
conclusion, the Court identified a number of related but distinct 
concerns protected by constitutional due process, including the 
right to intimate associations, the right to individual autonomy, 
and the protection of children.217 Critically, these concerns were 
amplified by equal protection principles triggered by the 
discriminatory effect of same-sex marriage bans.218 In Michael 
Coenen’s words, “the Due Process Clause alone might fail to 
resolve the question of whether a ban on same-sex marriage is 
unconstitutional, but once the Equal Protection Clause is added to 
the picture, the question can only come out one way.”219 
The Court’s immigration rulings also have sometimes 
employed constitutional combination analysis. Plyler v. Doe,220 for 
example, raised the question whether states can constitutionally 
deny public education to the children of undocumented 
noncitizens.221 The combined harms of a law both depriving 
children of a right to education and discriminating on the basis of 
immigration status (and possibly race) led the Court to invalidate 
the law.222 Here too, only the joint force of the Equal Protection and 
                                                                                                     
amendment).   
 214. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 215. See id. at 2602–03 (stating that the Due Process Clause and Equal 
Protection Clause “are connected in a profound way”). 
 216. See id. at 2607–08 (“It follows that the Court also must hold—and it now 
does hold—that there is no lawful basis for a State to refuse to recognize a lawful 
same-sex marriage performed in another State on the ground of its same-sex 
character.”). 
 217. See id. at 2597 (“In addition these [Due Process] liberties extend to 
certain personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy, including 
intimate choices that define personal identity and beliefs.”). 
 218. See id. at 2603 (using bans on interracial marriage as an example). 
 219. Coenen, supra note 112, at 1079.   
 220. 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
 221. See id. at 205 (“The question presented by these cases is whether, 
consistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Texas 
may deny to undocumented school-age children the free public education that it 
provides to children who are citizens of the United States or legally admitted 
aliens.”). 
 222. See id. at 223–24 (explaining that the challenged law did not satisfy the 
intermediate level of constitutional scrutiny applied by the Court).   
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Due Process Clauses facilitated the result.223 Similarly, some 
scholars have cast the Court’s ruling in Arizona as based on 
equal-protection-informed federalism.224  
The idea that clauses might be combined to advance 
proportionality is arguably inherent in U.S. constitutional design 
writ large.225 As Vicki Jackson has written:  
Proportionality bears a special relationship to government in a 
constitutional democracy. For an essential idea of constitutional 
democracy is that in confrontations between citizens and 
government, government is restrained and avoids oppressive 
and arbitrary action. The means to achieve this goal are varied, 
but requiring proportionality of action is one way in which the 
idea of limited government can be realized.226 
The Constitution’s Preamble reflects this democratic commitment 
to “establish justice” as a governing principle.227 To be sure, the 
Preamble has never been understood to confer any rights not 
specifically granted by the Constitution, but it may provide 
interpretive support for the idea of a general (or implied) authority 
for some form of constitutional proportionality review, including 
through hybrid claims.228  
                                                                                                     
 223. Moreover, as Brandon Garrett and Kerry Abrams have argued, had the 
Court viewed other immigration cases through the proper intersectional 
constitutional lens, the results might have come out differently. See Abrams & 
Garrett, supra note 213, at 1324–26 (discussing Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 
(1977)).  
 224. See HIROSHI MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW 130–42 (2014); 
Lucas Guttentag, The Forgotten Equality Norm in Immigration Preemption: 
Discrimination, Harassment, and the Civil Rights Act of 1870, 8 DUKE J. CONST. 
L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 4 (2013) (“Courts should revitalize the equality norm in deciding 
whether a particular state immigration provision impedes federal interests or 
hinders federal goals.”). Arguably, federalism analysis also sometimes 
incorporates proportionality norms. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 
507, 520 (1997) (“There must be a congruence and proportionality between the 
injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.”); Cade, 
supra note 151, at 1042–46 (arguing that proportionality norms informed the 
Court’s federalism analysis in Arizona).  
 225. See Jackson, supra note 116, at 3106–09 (discussing scholars tracing 
proportionality from Aristotle through the Magna Carta to influence the design 
of U.S. constitutional democracy). 
 226. Id. at 3108–09. 
 227. U.S. CONST. pmbl.  
 228. Cf. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 953 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]he Constitution of the United States [is] designed, among other things, ‘to 
establish Justice.’”); Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 54–55 
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Some immigration enforcement actions undoubtedly will 
implicate multiple constitutional rights, each of which is 
independently relevant to the government’s attempt to remove the 
noncitizen. Aggregated in particularly egregious cases, these 
constitutional concerns might sometimes accumulate sufficient 
decisional strength to invalidate removal orders. For example, 
noncitizens who have been targeted on racial grounds, and who 
also have compelling ties and significant equities may be able to 
point to both the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the 
Fifth Amendment (as well as, potentially, the Fourth 
Amendment). Sometimes other constitutional constraints will be 
relevant too, such as retaliation-based First Amendment claims. 
At least in cases where the asserted basis for the removal penalty 
derives from a criminal conviction, the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment could be invoked as 
well. To the extent these claims arise from arbitrary and capricious 
removal policies, the principles articulated in Judulang may also 
be relevant.229 
As these rights accumulate, they may gain sufficient combined 
strength to justify invalidation of a deportation order. There may 
be situations in which the proportionality protections of the Due 
Process Clause or Eighth Amendment alone would not justify a 
stay of removal, but, if coupled with government retaliation on the 
basis of protected speech or an unlawful seizure, would together 
accumulate sufficient weight for judicial intervention.230 Such 
relief may be rare, and likely would more typically involve 
long-time legal residents or persons with clear pathways to lawful 
status. But even in the case of an unauthorized noncitizen, the 
appropriateness of hybrid-rights proportionality review may 
sometimes be relatively clear, for example where the person is a 
DACA recipient who bears little or no culpability in the underlying 
immigration offense, knows only this country, and has other strong 
                                                                                                     
(1994) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“[I]t is entirely appropriate for a court to give 
controlling weight to the Founders’ purpose to ‘establish Justice.’”).  
 229. See supra Part IV.C (detailing the Court’s “hard look” review of an 
agency immigration policy). 
 230. Cf. Arial Porat & Eric A. Posner, Aggregation and Law, 122 YALE L.J. 2, 
46–51 (2012) (explaining how government activity implicating multiple 
constitutional rights, while individually weak, may nevertheless “normative[ly] 
aggregat[e]” to produce a joint constitutional violation). 
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favorable factors, but who DHS has nonetheless targeted for 
removal on the basis of First Amendment protected protest speech.  
Indeed, Judge Forrest’s habeas decision in Ragbir’s case seems 
to present a not-quite-articulated cumulative constitutional 
analysis. Recall that the Court not only invoked the Due Process 
Clause’s protection of liberty and notice requirement, but also 
gestured towards the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against 
cruel and unusual punishment (Ragbir’s removal order was 
predicated upon a years-prior criminal conviction), and the First 
Amendment’s protections of core political speech.231 While these 
might independently have failed to generate any form of relief, 
Judge Forrest found that together they at least compelled the 
government to release him temporarily to return to his family.232 
If a court were to more concretely aggregate the government’s 
constitutional infringements in a case like Ragbir’s, an even 
stronger judicial remedy might well be warranted.  
To be sure, the appropriate remedy will depend on the 
circumstances of each case and the joint strength of the cumulative 
proportionality concerns implicated. In certain cases, for example, 
a judicially-imposed delay (rather than outright invalidation) of 
the government’s desired action might suffice.233 In Ortiz’s case, for 
example, a stay of removal would have allowed time for 
adjudication of his wife’s family’s petition, thereby avoiding the 
ten-year bar to adjustment of status triggered by his removal from 
the country. 
Much more can be said, but not within the confines of these 
pages. For now, I simply flag the possibility that this emerging 
hybrid rights jurisprudence might provide a substantial foothold 
from which courts can move forward in engaging in at least limited 
proportionality review of removal decisions.  
V. Conclusion 
Judicial admonishments of the federal government’s 
indiscriminate and excessive approach in cases such as Mr. Ortiz’s 
                                                                                                     
 231. See Ragbir v. Sessions, No. 18-cv-236, 2018 WL 623557, at *1–3 (S.D.N.Y. 
Jan. 29, 2018) (addressing multiple constitutional issues). 
 232. See id. at *3 (granting the petition for habeas corpus). 
 233. But see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f) (2012) (limiting injunctive relief). 
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and Mr. Ragbir’s are noteworthy. The courts’ decisions have 
salutary effects even if the relief offered is limited. No less 
important, these decisions at least gesture towards proportionality 
review of deportation. In this Article, I have outlined doctrinal 
developments that may lead courts to travel farther down this path 
in the future. To be sure, if proportionality review is to find its way 
into judicial scrutiny of removal orders, it will most likely be at the 
retail level, rather than through invalidation of underlying 
statutory criteria for deportation. The federal courts have long 
afforded Congress significant leeway in shaping rules governing 
entry and removal of noncitizens.234 Despite that general 
deference, however, recent doctrinal developments—particularly 
with regard to hybrid rights and proportionality-based reasoning 
in other contexts—might one day soon prompt courts to intervene 
in disproportionate or retaliatory deportation. 
                                                                                                     
 234. But see, e.g., Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1686 (2017) 
(holding that a statute setting different residency requirements for U.S. citizen 
fathers and mothers seeking to transmit birthright citizenship to their 
non-marital children born outside the United States violates the Equal Protection 
Clause). 
